

The Land country and the People.

Watercourses like in the sow basin. While the tributaries to the San (eg. the Tanew, the Lubaczowka, the Szkło, and the Wisznia) generally have an east-west direction, the rivers and streams flow in the bow basin mostly in a northeasterly direction. The mountain country in the south gives its water mainly to the Dniester off; they flow towards him consistently in a north-south direction. So also the Wereszyca, which, coming from the area north-west of Lemberg, forms several elongated lakes on its way, also here and there heavily marshy banks. The watercourses of the San basin thus offers an army [?] fighting in an easterly direction no major difficulties, probably but the tributaries to the Dniester, primarily the Wereszyca. she lays itself as a barrier in front of those who approach Lemberg from the west wants to attack here. This barrier finds at its northern end, So in the Majdan area, to the north-west, a natural one continuation through the San--Bug watershed, which presents itself to the attacker like a wall.

The road conditions in the country are poor. Only a few cities and country towns are connected with [paved ?] roads. This applies in particular to the area from Jaroslau to Lemberg. Things are better east of the Galician capital in this respect. Two roads lead through the area from Jaroslau one via laworow to Lemberg, the other in a north-easterly direction to the Russian border town of Tomaszow. Leads from here via Rawa Ruska a major road to the Galician capital, which is again connected to Przemyśl by such. that on Sadowa Wisznia on this road is connected to Rawa Ruska via laworow—Niemirow, while from Niemirow you can reach the town of Jaroslau via Lubaczow. Finally is Grodek Jag. on the Lemberg—Przemyśl road via Zolkiew connected to Sokal at the bow. Otherwise in the San basin are only Country lanes and aisles exist, mostly over time caused by the traffic from village to village and each other characterized by a wide, sandy road. Gas area of the battlefield is, except for the surrounding area from Lemberg, relatively sparsely populated. There lived before

the beginning of the war around 50 people per square kilometer. It is primarily inhabited by Ruthenians, also known as Ukrainians Country, then Poles and numerous Jews. While the latter almost live and trade exclusively in the country towns, the Ruthenian dwells in the villages and settlements. These are very extensive and irregularly built and consist of small, poor wooden houses with thatched roofs and stone Stack. The country towns have a village-like character. The soil does not permit extensive farming; indeed he gives good opportunities for

cattle and poultry breeding through the pasture. So the chicken can be found everywhere and in large numbers. Horse breeding is in full bloom. The Galician horse is small and unsightly, but an excellent draft animal much and is very frugal.

Located at the northern limit of the Pontic climate range, the part of Galicia in question has cold winters and hot summers. During the operations up to the last third of June the sky was cloudless. The sun sent their hot rays on the sandy soil of the country whose high clouds of dust widely betrayed every movement of troops and columns. Thunderstorms followed later. During the period of Russian occupation, in epidemics and vermin got the upper hand in this area the more so as hygiene is utterly unknown to the population lagging behind in culture. The Ruthenian pawn runs even in the blazing summer sun in sheep's clothing. It ruled, as we had to ascertain during the advance, on the whole Land typhus, cholera, abdominal typhus, smallpox, etc. As a result, the troops had to be forbidden to enter the localities to prove what these in the uninviting appearance of Avoided villages on their own. They related consistently bivouac.

The fact that a German order appeared instructing the troops to Russian conquered trenches to fill up immediately and if there is the Combat situation allowed, not to be used for combat purposes, since

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the trenches had to be considered contaminated. Water could only be enjoyed in a boiled state, a compulsion that felt quite uncomfortable in the great heat. It is clear that the state of the theater of war the already not easy task of the troops significantly more difficult. The great heat, the sandy paths, the numerous swampy water courses, which are huge, often almost completely pathless forest areas affected by all weapons, especially of infantry and artillery, advancing unfavorably. Columns and trains did not have it easy. It's a good one Signs of the perfectly working rearward connections that, despite the rapid advance of hostilities and despite the planned road, bridge and rail destruction by the Russians, neither ammunition nor food shortages occurred at any point. The stage service worked perfectly. In mid-June the railway was able to from Crakow to Jaroslau can be put back into operation.

Events in Galicia until mid-June 1915.

From Gorlice-Tarnow to the San and the situation in Galicia in early June. With a powerful blow, the 11th Germans had and the Imperial and Royal 4th Army of Generaloberst v. Mackensen in the days of May 2-4, 1915, the strong Russian position systems in and east of the line Gorlice-Tarnow south-east Cracow broken through*) and the enemy in fierce battles in thrown back behind the San in the two weeks that followed (sketch 1). A great deed was accomplished! one with all A field position that had been developed for months, provided with strong obstacles and was defended by brave troops breached frontally with full success. For the first

Paint in modern war history! Through The Russian front in southern Poland was also a powerful blow faltered; she had to go beyond the forest mountains of Lysa

*) See Lest 21 of the individual representations.

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Gora be taken back. But in the Carpathians, where on Dukla-Passe the Russian stood on Hungary's soil was the retreat degenerated into wild flight. To the gates of Przemyśl Fortress the tsar's soldiers had fled; but not all had these achieved. Already on May 12, 1915, ten days after Beginning of the battle, the allied German-Austrian- Hungarian troops about 140000 prisoners, 100 guns and 300 machine guns in their hands. The defeated enemy stubbornly staying on their heels, the bandages of the Generaloberst v. Mackensen reached the San in mid-May. The guard took Jaroslau and went here in the night of 16/17. over the river; to the right and left of her they fought each other remaining pursuers the exit. On May 24th the bridge fell head Radymno south of Jaroslau. Now Przemyśl could also from to be tackled north. (Sketches 1 and 2.) Began on the 29th here the opening of fire of the siege artillery. On May 31st Prussian, Bavarian and Austro-Hungarian associations joined against the fortifications to attack. It was three days later the whole fortress fell I Western Galicia and the Carpathians were free from the enemy. But the Russians still had East Galicia and the State capital — Lviv — in hands.

The Tsar's troops were after the great May Defeats thrown back into a line by early June been taken from the Romanian border via Kolomea— Dolina-Stryj-Drohobycz to the east of Przemyśl, then in front of the corps of the German 11th standing east of the San Army — XXXXI. Reserve, K. and K. VI., Guard and X. Corps — led in a wide arc, open to the west, about 20 km around Jaroslau to the mouth of the Lubaczowka then on the west bank of the San via Rudnik the Vistula town of Tarnobrzeg to reach. There she crossed the stream to Poland west of Ostrowiec — west of Radom past the Pilica den Connection to those opposing the Commander-in-Chief East armies to win.

Before this line was between the for various reasons Upper Dniester and the Pilica pursuing the allies

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come to a halt. In the armies of the Colonel-General v. Mackensen had to resupply and the arrival newly arriving reinforcements have to be awaited. In addition regroupings took place all along the Galician front. So the enemy had to build himself up and his defenses strong can reorganize. Often were from him with the help of Population also laid out extensive rear positions been. (Sketch 2.) In the particularly endangered area between Przemyśl and Lubaczow, i.e. before the troops of the 11th Army, he had brought in numerous reinforcements from all fronts. Ahead of her and further north on the San he had launched strong

counterattacks in the first days of June, which were only in the area Rudnik were able to achieve insignificant success.

South of the Upper Dniester had the Southern Army of the General of the infantry vs. Linsingen the Russian position on June 1st broken through between Stryj and Drohobycz. It was June 3rd reached the Dniester. Almost at the same time, the Imperial and Royal Szurmay group to the west managed to cross this section of the river fighting to reach. But relax here in the next Days very changeful fighting, which the left flank and the Bending down the southern army endangered. As a result, this one had to initially be content with the Dniester line between ben to hold the Kolomea—Lviv and Stryj—Tarnopol railways. Further south, on June 7, the pursuit of those in front of the front began the Imperial and Royal 7th Army of General der Kavallerie Freiherr v. Planter-Baltin slowly retreating from the Prut to the Dniester Russian forces.

Had the plan to hold the Dniester-Wisznia-San line cannot be realized by the Russian army command, since the in During the first days of June there were mass attacks by the Tsar's troops east of Jaroslau the German formations had not been able to throw back over the lower Wisznia and the San. so the Russians seemed to have made an entirely new decision. Even while the allies are extensive Troop Shifts and Regroupings between the upper Dniester and the Vistula, aviators indicated

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reports and other news indicate that strong Russian Forces in front of the 11th and 4th Imperial and Royal Army to the east marched off. At the Mackensen High Command they came to that Expect the enemy to leave strong rearguards behind in front of the 11th and perhaps also the Imperial and Royal 4th Army dismantled, but held in front of the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army. Apparently wanted the opponent to cover or actively defend his Dniester» Form a strong right wing in front and protect it by defending the Wereszyca section with its many lakes and in a fortified position adjoining to the north, which through Airplane picture in line Ianow — west of Magierow — west Rawa Ruska—Narol Miasto was found and moving north leaned against the swampy Tanev section. This very strong defense system is known under the name Grodek—Magierow position known.

Lemberg and the Grodek—Magierow Position. (Map 2.)

Lemberg, the capital of Galicia, the target of Russian desires already in peace, was after the heroic, sacrificial leadership battles of the Austro-Hungarian armies since September 2, 1914 in the possession of the tsarist armies. The Russian Those in power had left no stone unturned in the long Time of occupation to make the city Russian. One didn't even think of revealing them again. she should Russia's westernmost residence city. For her protection one had created generous fortifications; armies of pioneers, engineers, worker battalions and many thousands of civilian laborers had worked hard here for months. The city is situated in a region

surrounded by steep mountain walls basin, which extends to the east in the wide Ouell valley of the Peltew river opens, and through its edge to the west a small one tributary of the Wereszyca has gnawed through. South of the approx 250 m above sea level, the Czartowska Skala rises in front of the city gates 414 m altitude. They join, the city to the south-east and Bounding south, a series of crests and elevations averaging 1200 feet (360 m) elevation above sea level. law

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west evade the cornerstones of Sknilov (329 m) and Rzesna (320 m) heights the city to the gaze of those approaching from outside. In the north, the mountain range of Lysa Gora (380 m) forms with its southern and eastern foothills the end of the boilers. In the north-east part of the city the Sand Mountain climbs up 413 m altitude. From him the beholder has a beautiful one View of the sea of houses. The location of the city is very reminiscent those of the industrial towns of Elberfeld and Barmen in the Bergisches Land. Lwow, as Lemberg is called by the Russians, counted before the Wars about 250000 inhabitants. industry, trade and transport were in bloom. Railways provided the connection with the interior of the Danube monarchy in all directions and the Russian border. Numerous electric trams provided traffic in the city, the big, wide ones Streets, beautiful facilities and some engineering structures. Lviv was the heart of Galicia.

The fortifications built by the Austrians in peacetime were reinforced by the Russians and by numerous new buildings been added. As a result, in June 1915, a wreath was drawn of 60 more or less resistant plants around Galicia Capital city. A solid ring of about 50 mm in circumference! But before an attacker with these fortifications fight could take, he had to 20 km to the west broke through the strong fortification system of the Grodek-Magierow position. There the Galician capital had to be fought for; there the first iron dice fell about her fate. The Grodek-Magierow position was under Use of the wide Wereszyca section and the high Watershed created between San and Bug. She leaned south in the Manasterzec area on the north bank of the Dniester and ran via Komarno—Lubien Wk.—Grodek Jag. to Cuniow along the east bank of the Wereszyca. She converted to Cuniow across the river and stretched across Ottenhausen-Wielkopole to Ianow, where it embraced Lake Ianow (Ianowski Staw) to the east. Then she climbed over Stawki and Maidan to the watershed, on which she now climbs over hill 378 (Horodysko Hill)

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—Piaskowa—Height 343—Ilicfo Serekiewicz—A 358—A 350 — A 357 went and near the Galician border town of Narol Miasto ended. A connecting position extended from here along the north bank of the marshy Tanev to the west to the San and the Vistula. In the south, the position system followed the Russian Dnicster defences, which were on the left bank of the river to the Romanian border.

The Grodek-Magierow position was strategic well invested. Out of it, a powerful, even far inferior army, which was conscious of its task, could defend Lemberg for months. In the south was the Dniester with its bank Defense is an obstacle that can only be overcome with the greatest sacrifices and extraordinary means. That the allies German-Austro-Hungarian troops would force the departure here in order to attack Galicia's capital from the south pack seemed pretty much out of the question. So it was just that attack from the west. But he was very difficult, especially since he was under constant flank threat from Tanew had to take place. Doubtless the Russians have this when they set up the position of flank attack against the army attacking in front of the Grodek-Magierow position, which—if it was successful—this army in the Back hit, targeted.

The position was already protected by nature. From the Dniester up to Cuniow lay the Wereszyca valley with its broad valleys in front of her swamp and lake areas. A mighty forest belt of average stretched from Cuniow to south-west of Magierow 10 km wide in almost a jungle-like condition, only here and there cleared there by aisles. The only one through him- leading fixed way was the great road Iaroslau-laworow- Ianow-Lemberg. In the center piece this is in front of the attacker. Legendary forest zone formed the upper reaches of the Wereszyca with the Lakes and swamps near Ianow and Majdan further natural obstacles. Further north, where the forest in the height of magic row recedes to the west, one left that Attacking one through numerous, deep gorges, precipitous Marked mountain terrain. After all, nature offered

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less protection here than in the south, which is why one is expanding had paid particular attention to the position in the magic row area and to the north-west. (Relief map and sketch 5.)

There was the height 378 (Horodysko mountain) to a true fortress has been expanded. To the north of it the ravine area near Piaskowa had been skilfully exploited and broken through occupied numerous flanking trenches and strongpoints. The following height protruding further to the west 345 was a fortress in itself, a bulwark of great magnitude Strength north-west through a three ditch position until four consecutive lines continued via Mazury Szczerczyk-Lipnik. Further north-west there the rugged terrain, especially at Huta Obedynska, Opportunity to create great flanking assets. The position at Height 345 had a valley floor in front of it to the south, west and north-west, which was swampy in places was and presented itself as a so-called "uncovered level". was about 1 ion wide west and northwest of height 345. on they flowed down, coming from the west, a number of ravines, which could be seen for miles from 345. The heights lying between the ravines were so steep that riders could not get down to the valley infantry had to laboriously climb down.

From a tactical point of view, all parts of the powerful position were impeccably laid out; the attacker got flanks in every situation Fire; there was a good

field of fire. Your expansion made all credit to the Russian engineers. The ditches were clean manufactured and loopholes, strong shelters in Abundance available. magicow itself and the bumps between this place and the main position were strong fastened.

The terrain further back was also prepared for defence. (Sketch 2.) The enemy broke through the Wereszyca line Going north, the magicow position, he came across after a short time Land gain from another fortified line, the construction of which

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had only partially been completed. It stretched from the headwaters of the Tanev behind the upper, marshy Rata to the Area of Rawa Ruska, bypassed this city like a beachhead on the heights of Potylicz and Däbrowka and then led northeast of Magierow to the swamp lowlands of the upper Biala. Running north along it, they met at Lavrykov-Horodtsov on a strong system of fortifications west of the railroad Rawa Ruska-Lviv was laid out and connected with the southern wing north of Lemberg to a particularly resilient bulwark developed Lysa Gora leaned against. That was it Lemberg's fortress belt, in which the western works on the Rzesna ridge and the Sknilow height as well as that in the fort ring lying village Sknilow were to be addressed as strong bases. As a logical addition to the rear defense system, a well laid out one ran south from the village of Sknilow entrenched field position behind the Szczerek to the Dniester. From the rear defense system north of Lemberg the plants between Lemberg and the upper Biala were at Doörosin, as well as those extending north of this section until Dumycze completed. The entrenchments on the heights southwest of Glinsko were fortress-like in character.

All in all, powerful, carefully selected, immaculately constructed positions had been created that were by nature excellently protected and put all sorts of obstacles in front of the attacker. There, where nature does not give the gift of its protection in large so much had given, the strengthening of the positions was all the more so more generous. Out of both defense systems became in connection with the Tanew position the northern flank of a Lemberg attacking army always threatened.

The plans and orders of *Generaloberst* v. Mackensen. But these Russian positioning systems were known at the army headquarters of *Generaloberst* v. Mackensen in general, as the orders for regrouping and continuation of the attack were given. By agreement between the two Allied Army Commands were the *Generaloberst*

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v. Mackensen all between the upper Dniester and the Vistula standing allied forces subordinated. It was the K. and K. 2nd Army under the K. and K. General der Kavallerie v. Boehm Ermolli, the 11th German and the Imperial and Royal 4th Army,

the latter under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. Generaloberst v. Mackensen planned, after completed regrouping with the middle of the 11th Army to advance on Magierow and as far behind as possible advance east into Galicia. The Grodek section and the Lemberg Fortress should be bypassed to the north. The army flanks were to be covered by the Imperial and Royal 2nd and 4th Armies. To do this, Böhm-Ermolli's army had initially opposed the line To advance Komarno—Ianov and at the same time with a strong left Wings to encircle the fortified Grodek front from the north and roll up*). The boundary line of the two inner wings of the armies ran from Czerniawa (on the Wisznia) to Dabrowa (altitude north-west of Ianow). The Imperial and Royal 4th Army was to Protection in the San-Vistula triangle with strong forces between Sieniawa and Ulanow go across the San, supported by an advance by the left wing of 11th Army to the north Direction to Sieniawa. Then she had herself moving forward to join the 11th Army in the direction of Rawa Ruska, where lowest possible forces cover against the Tanev sector zn had to take over. The border between the 11th and K. u.K. 4th Army had passed Molodycz north of Dachnow. to rely on Deutschbach.

The messages coming in at 11th Army Headquarters made it increasingly unlikely that after recording the Attack movement Fighting with stronger enemy masses took place forward of the Grodek—Magierow position. In the position close to the front of the allies and about 10 km further east in line level Gora Graniczna—Moranec—Lake east Krakowiec—Wielkie Oczy—Height LadowaNiwa—Lubaczow—Dachnow—heights west of Cieszanow, developed vertci-

 *) First of all, the Grodek position was intended to be destroyed by an advance to be opened across the Dniester from the south; but the plan did not come to fruition.

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position was believed only with the resistance of having to reckon with hindsight. Generaloberst v. Mackensen wanted immediately after the regrouping has been completed, bring his armies forward for a decisive attack in the intended direction. At the June 9th could be considered the day of the general resumption procedure of 13. 6. 13 are designated. The Imperial and Royal 2nd Army intended only three divisions against the Wereszyca downwards to attack Drozdowice and advance ten divisions against the Cuniow-Ianow line; a division should serve as an army reserve stay behind the right wing.

In the 11th Army the main pressure should be shifted to the centre where the K. and K. VI. Corps, the Guards Corps and the XXII. Reserve corps between the Wisznia and the Lubaczowka stood. They were due to line up at 5:30 a.m. Northeast: K. and K. VI. Corps in general direction Nahaczow, Guard Corps via Wielkie Oczy on Klonice, XXII. Reserve Corps over Lukawiec on Krowica-Sama. On the right should be the XXXXI. Reserve-Corps the right flank of the K. u. K. VI. corps cover by it forced the exit via the Wisznia; besides it had the connection with that on the north wing of the army Boehm- Ermolli to keep fighting German Beskydy Corps and with Artillery in the rear of the enemy standing in front of this corps to

act. Left of the XXII. X. Army Corps had reserve corps to protect the left flank of the main shock group To cross Lubaczowka and first to the line heights north of Ruda—Siekiercka Gora—heights north of Surmaczowka reach. The combined Behr Corps standing west of it (56 and 119 Inf.-Div.) had already crossed the Lubaczowka line Radawa-Manasterz to push north to make it easier for the right wing of the Imperial and Royal 4th Army, which was beginning the battle for the San crossing near Sieniawa on that day, to change shore. If this purpose was achieved, then the corps to join the attack of the 11th army as soon as possible and to cover the left flank of this army until the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army was able to do this. In the second place, k.:i of the 11th Army should be ready on June 13:

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the 11th Bavarian Infantry Division northeast of Przemyśl the Pozdziej-Stubno road, the 8th Bavarian Reserve Division on route Radymno—Dunkowice, a brigade of the XXII. Reserve- Corps (88th Reserve Infantry Brigade) with a detachment of field artillery on the Jaroslau-Zapalów highway and finally the K. and 11th Honved Cavalry Division behind the right Wing of the K. & K. 4th Army.,

On the southern wing of this army was the 22nd German infantry tery division in the associations of the K. u. K. XVII. Army Corps to Enforcement of the San transition from the west in the Sie- never used. On the whole, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand wanted with 6 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division the San exceed) 51/» divisions were to cover in San—Vistula angle can be left in the old position. An infantry and % cavalry division were formed as army reserve eliminated. As the best line of cover against the north the 4th Army wanted to go south after crossing the San reach the Tanev lowlands, with the right wing extending up had to extend to the heights north of Cieszanów.

Mackensen's 11th Army. Before we do that As events follow, let me say a few more words allowed the troops, the Generaloberst v. Mackensen had available to attack Lemberg.

On the right wing, under the leadership of the well-established General der Kavallerie v. Boehm-Ermolli the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army, consisting mainly of the V., XVIII., XIX. and IV Army Corps and the 4th Cavalry Division of the Danube monarchy was formed. From their north wing fought the German Beskydy Corps of General der Kavallerie v. the Marwitz with the 4th Infantry Division, the 25th and 35th Reserve Divisions; his fame won in the East Beskydy will live forever. Before the guns, machine guns and Gunners of his divisions followed in early April 1915 Hungary descending Russian to stand.

North of the Beskiden Corps closed as right wing corps 11th Army the XXXXI. Reserve Corps of the General of the Infantry

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[chart]

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v. Francois with the 82nd and 81st Reserve Divisions. It belonged as well as the K. & K. VI., Guards and X. Army Corps as well as the 11th Bavarian and 119th Infantry Divisions of the 11th Army since their formation; they had their victorious banners carried from Gorlice-Tarnow to across the San. The K. and K. VI. Corps of Field Marshal Lieutenant Freiherr Arz v. ostriches and burg with the Hungarians of the K. and 39th Honved Infantry Division, and the Galician-Silesian K. & K. 12th Infantry Division competed since the May days with the Prussian Guard Corps fighting to his left, which was led by the General of the Infantry Freiherr v. Plettenberg fought and won. In addition to the 1st Guards Infantry Division of Colonel Eitel Friedrich Prince of Prussia, the 2nd Guards Infantry Division zuni corps associations. North of it was a war Volunteer Corps has been shot into the battle line Winners of Dirmude and the fighters of Lairgemarck from the autumn 1914, the XXII. Reserve Corps under the General der Kavallerie v. Falkenhayn, the brother of the then Chief of Staff of the German Field Army. To the Berlin 43rd and Inarkic 44th Reserve Division *) joined the 107th Infantry Division. At the Lubaczowka held the general of the infantry v. Emmich, the world-famous striker of Liège, his Hanoverian X. Arnlee Corps ready to attack with the 20th and 19th Infantry Divisions. The left Army wing formed the Major General's composite corps v. Behr, commander of the 119th Infantry Division, except for this one Division nor the 36th Infantry Division was subordinate. the Army reserves have already been mentioned. Among them were those from the first door of the Przemyśl Fortress, Royal Bavarian Lieutenant General Ritter v. Kneussl, led glorious 11th Bavarian Infantry Division and the 8th Bavarian known from the Vosges battles Reserve Division under the Royal Bavarian Lieutenant General Freiherr v. Stein, a well-known German artilleryman. The staff of In addition to the army command, high commands of the 11th Army also had

*) Of which on June 13, 1915 a reserve infantry brigade (88th) and a field artillery detachment Army Reserve, 1 Battalion to the 43rd Reserve Division, the remainder corps reserve.

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at the same time the daunting task of directing operations between the Dniester and the Vistula. Chief of the General Staff was colonel v. Seeckt.

The Imperial and Royal 4th Army were the Imperial and Royal XVII. Army Corps, which included the Casseler (22nd) Division of Lieutenant General Dieffenbach belonged to the K. and K. IX. and X Army Corps for Transition over the San determined.

All units were allowed as combat-tested, victorious troops be addressed. The German divisions had on the East or West theaters of war, most of them have already done excellent work on both. Now they should show again that they knew how to assert their will to win.

The Tsar's troops. In the fighting for Lemberg had the 11th Army the right wing of the Russian 8th and the left Wing and center of the Russian 3rd Army in front. Latter had been badly disheveled since G o r l i c e—T a r n o w. The troops of the 8th Army, on the other hand, did not feel defeated. prisoners this army put all the blame on the 3rd Army; their collapse had caused the Galician front to falter. In the fighting that followed, both Russian armies gave way to the line L e m b e r g—R a w a R u s k a—T a n e w section back, namely the 3rd Army in general in an east-northeast, the 8th Army in a purely easterly direction. In front of the 11th Army were established the VIII, XII, XVII, XXIII, XXVIII. and XXIX. Corps, as well as the II and V Caucasian Corps and the IV Cavalry Corps. On the right the XXI. and VII Corps, on the left the III. Caucasian corps in front of the inner ones wings of the neighboring armies. — The XXIII Corps assembled at Tomaszow had, in addition to two line Divisions the 3rd Guards Division in his formation; the eighth and XII. Corps each had five divisions.

Among the aforementioned, the XVII and VIII Corps played a significant role in the fighting in the East Asian War of 1904/05. The VIII Corps and that too XII. Corps possessed glorious traditions from the Russian

-Turkish wars 1877/78, as well as the 3rd Division of that time after non-existing XVII. Corps and the 3rd Guards Division. The defeats in May and in the first half of June had brought complete disorder to the associations; the big losses had greatly reduced the stocks of men and weapons. A shortage of officers was felt everywhere. The mood among troops was at times very bad, primarily in the 3rd Army. The prisoners complained loudly about their own artillery. A significant part of the guns was the allies in hands fallen; there was also a severe shortage of ammunition; also were numerous guns through excessive stress become unusable. The result was that the Russians already had this weapon with them in the breakthrough battle at Lubaczow handled with great caution and, when the balance tipped itself sided with the allies, they quickly escaped to safety brought. But it must be emphasized that the Russian artillery, when it came up, was a very formidable opponent, who shot very well. The Russian infantry is in the Defense basically an ideal squad; she stands where it is placed. However, she kept the strong German Artillery fire not off. Again and again the prisoners could be heard saying: "If it weren't for the German artillery!" it was primarily due to the great effect of the heavy artillery the constant pounding of field artillery, which was gradually breaking down Russian nerves. At the moment of storm, the defenders often received our people, standing open in the ditch, with the most violent gunfire.

The breakthrough battle at Lubaczow and the pursuit.

The 12-15 June 1915. With the utmost accuracy had until the evening of June 11, 1915 the extensive Shifts behind the German-Austro-Hungarian Front completed between Dniester and Vistula. The new breakthrough battle began on

the morning of the 12th, according to plan, by the assembled corps of Major General v. behr yourself

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forced the crossing over the Lubaczowka down Radawa, with the 56th Division on the right, the 119th on the left. The Russian did desperate resistance, especially in the dense woods; but in front of the resolutely attacking 119th Division he had to give way to the north. Tied up by this pressure from the south, he was unable to assist the 22nd Infantry Division in the skilfully initiated transition across the Lubaczowka estuary and deny the San. North of it could also die K. K. 26th Landwehr Infantry Division the right bank of the river to win. Sieniawa was commanded by the 167th Infantry Regiment of the 22nd Division captured and turned right 2 km west of Radawa created a bridgehead leaning against the Lubaczowka. fierce Russian counterattacks failed; on the contrary, it still succeeded to take some solid bases northeast of the city. three thousand five hundred prisoners, especially from the III. caucasian Corps remained in the hands of the victors.

On the morning of the 13th the mighty masses of Generaloberst v. Mackensen to attack. Did you believe that that they could easily overrun Russian positions wrong. Nevertheless, on the whole front with dawn (4 a.m in the morning) a strong hail of shells lasting one and a half hours Mortars, howitzers and cannons leveled the enemy's positions, the infantry rushed to and fro surging battles. In the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army only the left wing of the Beskydy Corps to gain a few kilometers of space on and north of the Przemyśl-Lemberg railway and to approach the western edge of Hodynie. The XXXXI. Reserve Corps took Czerniawa and exceeded in hot wrestling the wide, partially marshy lowland of the Wisznia. In spite of raging Russian machine gun and rifle fire, despite Russian counter-attacks the heights of the east bank were scaled, Reached Malnow and climbed the A 246. north of it snatched the Hungarians, Galicians and Moravian-Silesians from the field lieutenant marshals v. Arz the Russian the height /X 249 and the Connection heights north and south. The Guard Corps was over Ehotyniec—Mkyny—Tuchla advanced. On the south wing

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was at the 1st Guards Infantry Division a renewed artillery Preparation against the section on both sides of Mlyn necessary become; but then, after bitter hand-to-hand combat, the corps quickly threw the enemy out of their entrenchments and was with the right wing south of the Szkło, with the left on along the almost impassable forests north of Kobylnica-Ruska bumped up. To the south, keeping up with the Arz Corps, which was somewhat lagging behind, the Guards stood victorious in the evening Heights hard east of Kobylnica-Woloska and north-east of Kobylnica- Ruska. About 4000 prisoners from the Russian 34th Division and of the

Caucasian Grenadier Division were introduced. Immediately south of the Lubaczowka, the XXII. Reserve Corps Heavy village fights, especially in MiekiszNw.; then it hit the Russians, who were tenaciously defending themselves, a few kilometers deep Woods pushed back to the east of the village, on the left flank protected by the Hanoverians of Corps Emmich. here had the 20th Infantry Division on the right wing den But struggled over the Lubaczowka and a about 3 km created a deep bridgehead between the railway and the Iaroslau-Oleszyce road; a new Russian position commanded her Stop. On the left wing was the 19th Infantry Division Failed to change bank. In the Lubaczowka—San corner had Man under constant heavy fights and rejection of numerous Russian onslaught extended the bridgehead. Incidentally, were here detachments initiated, whose aim was the composite Corps and the 22nd Infantry Division to be replaced by Austro-Hungarian troops and the German units for the To make available attack thrust of the left wing of the 11th Army towards Oleszyce. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand hoped to next day with his right wing the advance on Cewkow to be able to begin, especially since his Austrian 10th Infantry Division had managed to wrest the eastern bank of the San from the enemy in the course of the 13th as far as the Piskorowice area.

The situation on the evening of June 13 was quite favourable. Thirteen thousand prisoners were brought in. The Russian position was [worden] through, however, under unexpectedly heavy fighting

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11th Army had been able to gain ground by 3-9 km in a width of about 50 km; partially one stood even before the new Russian one, known from aerial pictures*). Position stretching above Mokrzany—at Gora Graniczna—A258 west of Bonow—west of Morance—Wielkie Oczy—height of Ladowa Niwa-Oleszyce moved north. At the headquarters of Generaloberst v. Mackensen it was assumed that the enemy, as a result of the unexpected breakthrough through a large part of his front fastening system, the parts still held by it vacate and to the rear position, maybe even to the Grodek—Magierow position would retreat. earlier Attack, possibly immediate follow-up attacks were on June 14th. necessary. The Austrian 4th Army had with its right wing to advance on Cewkow under strong echelon on the left.

In fact, on the night of June 14, the Russians began of the K. & K. 2nd Army and further north their retreat. she sat down again in the Mokrzany-Wielkie Oczy position. On the 14th this was also done, but again not without it bloody wrestling. While the troops of General v. Boehm In the course of the day Ermolli advanced towards the new Russian resistance line, the Corps Francois attacked bitterly but in vain the heights near Sarny and west of Morance and also the-K. and 39th Honved Infantry Division the enemy to the south of the Krakowiec Lake, the K. and K. 12th Infantry Division broke into the enemy Lines straddling the Szklo, leaving Krakowiec and the north subsequent position system could be taken. as but the 1st and 2nd Guards Infantry Divisions under the personal leadership of their intrepid divisional commanders, des Prince Eitel Friedrich of Prussia and the lieutenant general v.

Winckler, the fortified, tenaciously defended heights to the west and south Wielkie Oczy stormed, the 1st Guards Division this Country town took and both divisions in the unstoppable Swings despite strong Russian counter-attacks, the wide Bachniede—

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The Galicians were able to cross the border to the west of Boza Wola and to the western slope of the A 272 hill still to conquer Ruda Kochanowska and Swidnica. The left wing faced particular difficulties that day of Plettenberg's corps and the general's wartime volunteers v. encountered Falkenhayn. The infantry had to move in the pathless, densely undergrowth wooded areas of the steep Ladowa Niwa work forward. When you suddenly came across a cleverly placed enemy position in the thicket of the forest, you had to these are taken without artillery support. Every possibility was closed to the artillery, the sister weapon to help. There were only a few guns over the steep Slopes and through the deep gorges on narrow forest paths can bring up; but there was nowhere to fire. The enemy had installed themselves in the dense undergrowth with a very short field of fire in front of the front. So the infantry had to Victory palm at this point among some heavy sacrifices achieve alone. But the heroes of Flanders and the division of the ruthlessly committed Kgl. Württemberg Major General v. Mosers made it. They threw the opponent off the inhospitable heights A 259 - A 240 and stormed in the terrible Bayonet battles still in the evening at the edge of the forest north-west of Tarnawskie, Lukawiec and the Babina Gora. Very violent had happened here! North of the Lubaczowka had the Hanoverian divisions of Generalleutnants Ritter und noble v. Oetinger and Hofmann several rows heavily entrenched and furiously defended bases in the forest terrain. She saw the setting sun with her right wing in the height of the XXII. Reserve Corps, centered on the edge of the forest southwest of Sucha Wola, in Lipina and just south of Stare Siolo. The left wing of the 19th Infantry Division was sharply after Southwest bent over as the composite corps had not be able to advance. It lay with its east wing in torment Fight north-east of Radawa. The composite corps had itself as well as the parts east of the San, the K. & K. 4th Army had to fend off heavy mass Russian assaults; only

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at Piskorowice the Imperial and Royal IX. Corps made some progress scored and brought another division (106th) over the San. The 22nd Infantry Division had the Austro-Hungarian XVIII. Corps must be left. The corps Emmich was from the reserves of the 11th Army, the Brigade Reuter (88th) des XXII. Reserve Corps sent in support.

Again the Russian position was breached, and indeed thanks to good artillery preparation, excellent attacking spirit and bravery overcoming any obstacle of the Guard and the XXII. Reserve corps across the board between the Radymno-Lemberg

highway and the Lubaczowka. Nineteen Russian divisions were deployed in front of the 11th Army been. Her efforts had been in vain. According to the reports received, it was to be assumed that the Russians were now in retreat into the Grodek— Magicrow would take up a position. However, they did not do this. she under the impression of the successes of our guard corps only their main forces in front of the Arz Corps from the Miszawa Heights and from the forests of the Ladowa Niwa [zrirück] and left strong rear guards there.

The early morning of June 13 was all over the front a new battle ensued. The Russians had in front of the middle of the 11th Army brought in new troops; but just got there again achieved the greatest successes. First, the K. u. K. 12th Infantry Division, the 1st and 2nd Guards Infantry Divisions and the Russian 43rd Reserve Division to the north Rearguard from section to section in front of you. The Divisions Winckler and Runckel fell in the woods to the east the Ladowa Niwa the most difficult part of the task. Already early the sun sent down its hot rays, which in the dense undergrowth not a little added to the troops working in front. The "coolness of the forest shade" had soon turned into greenhouse temperatures. The undergrowth was full of Russian patrols brave grenadier and war volunteer had to lose his life, without seeing the enemy. The field artillery

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initially followed on narrow aisles. But soon heard too these up, and one had to pave the way to the compass. Those were bad hours! Often the guides anxiously asked where their troops would be; the jungle-like stock swallowed everything. Finally—at about 8 o'clock in the morning—the forest cleared in front of the 43rd Reserve Division. Their vanguard snatched from the enemy Tarnawskie and the forest bare areas southeast of it. left of her fought the regiments of the sister division Dorrer hard enemy superpower. Then at 10 o'clock in the morning field artillery came of the 43rd Reserve Division out of the woods. The enemy ahead of the 44th Reserve Division, which it is flanking you as called. Soon one grenade after another rushed into the Russian ranks flanking them. We'll see at 11 a.m here the Russians in full retreat. Bor of Division Run^rl and your guard corps will always be the enemy's resistance tougher. But it's no use. Develop the German divisions in thy exceedingly difficult forest and hill terrain their whole dexterity and attack power. In the evening stand the victorious Associations of General v. Falkenhayn to your Zawadowka— Wisznia section from Hruszow to Granica. Almost in the right At an angle to this is the front of Plettenberg's corps edge of the forest west of Klonice via the east exit from Drohomysl after the heights north of Nahaczow. Meanwhile also had the Imperial and Royal troops of Arz's corps threw out the Russians who were still holding in front of them and, advancing to the east, the line Western edge of Przedborze—Western edge of Nahaczow reached. south of Krakowiec-Sees had the XXXXI. Reserve Corps the enemy position breached; the Stocken division on the left wing reached the watercourses by nightfall at Morance-Broszki.

The Imperial and Royal 2nd Army also wore theirs in various places flags through the tenaciously defended Russian positions. So the enemy was thrown off the important Gora Graniczna; in front of the Beskydy Corps he had to go to just west of Bonow soft. The Russians were on the whole front from the Dniester to beaten again to the Lubaczowka. But also north of this

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[sector] the successes achieved on the 15th were very significant. General v Emmich and his Hanoverians had covered the extensive forest area north of the Lubaczowka and in a bold grab with the 20th Infantry Division crossed the Przerwa section at Opaka and Huszcze. The 19th Infantry Division succeeded in the hot struggle for Oleszyce to stay winner. Those to cover the left flank of the corps Generaloberst v. Mackensen provided the 8th Bavarian Reserve Division reached from Zapalow via Stare Siolo to the area west of Oleszyce Str. In front of the whole front of Corps, the Russians were in strong positions in front of Lubaczow.

Opposite the composite corps and right wing enemy resistance also began in the K.u.K. 4th Army to flag. In bitter fighting, the allies could troops advance their lines beyond the forest bare of Wola Molodycz and through the forests south and west of Cieplice as well as up advance hard east of Dornbach. Kurylowka was snatched from the enemy. Total stood by the army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand on the evening of June 15 about six Austro-Hungarian divisions from the east bank of the San

Mackensen's decision to continue operations. "Only where the unit's training up got down to the lowest levels and one thorough military training available is, one can undertake daring ventures Allow me." (La France militaire, July 16, 1916.)

June 15, 1915, had shown that the Russians were not retreating to the Grodek-Magierow position; they had despite heavy losses the 11th Army alone had from 12-15. June 34,000 prisoners taken and 60-70 machine guns captured again and again put up bitter resistance. Apparently the enemy was trying to stop the German advance in stop numerous rearguard and intermediate positions to behind it the Dniester—Grodek—Magierow—Tanew position further expand And as a precaution Eastern Galicia from all develop-

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to vacate honestly. But sooner or later there was an attack against the Grodek-Magierow position; how could you overcome the fastest and best? Generaloberst v. Mackensen and his chief of staff faced a momentous decision.

Through air reconnaissance, prisoner statements, communications the liberated Galician population was aware of the army command that the Russians

had been on the Wereszyca-Grodek- Magierow — the new position had worked. The aerial photographs and a mark on the map proved that this was a generous facility.

The decision that was taken was: restless pursuit, immediate attack from the great position and breakthrough of the same!

Restless Pursuit! Before the final reports of June 13th templates were worn in the High Command Mackensen got the impression that the Russians were going to Evening from the last prepared line forward the Grodek—Magierow position would be thrown. kept the Opponent then his previous combat overrun, so offered "der Advantage of the war of movement and thus the opportunity to advance sufficient occupation with the enemy itself in the Grodek position to penetrate its power of resistance must then, instead of being concentrated and strengthened eastward, before our advance decrease". Therefore immediate attack on the big position and breakthrough of the same! Breakthrough! Certainly he had succeeded near Gorlice-Tarnow, between Przemyśl and Lubaczow too! But! — — there was and always is Breakthroughs very many "but". Before the world war one stood generally very skeptical about the breakthrough in military circles opposite to. The only exception was actually one army, the french one And just this did in the fall of 1914 and very often later have to realize that a, even by any means in the path of a breakthrough attempt that has been guided and prepared for a long time cannot easily succeed.

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The experience of the Japanese in the East Asian War 1904/05 urged caution. The military literature no also rightly drawn attention to the great difficulties that stand in the way of a successful breakthrough. So one reads in General v. Old "Army and Fleet" about the Breakthrough: "History knows few examples of success. The perfection of firearms has breakthrough the battlefield even more difficult. Possess fairly thin fire lines today a resistance that can hardly be overcome." General i.e. Blume says in his "Strategy": "The tactical breakthrough appears by day even for troops of superior prowess can only be carried out in exceptionally favorable terrain and strength conditions." However, the terrain in front of the large position in question was not favorable for the attack Artillery, however, was greatly superior to the allies; at Infantry faced each other in terms of the number of opponents Guns maybe the same, probably the Russians had in here but the excess weight.

Appropriately, General Freiherr v. Freytag-Loringhoven, the Chief of the Deputy General Staff of the Army, in his "Reflections on the Russo-Japanese War": "As is well known, the French still hold onto the idea of tactical breakthrough. They give it a national tinge by describing it as Napoleonic. What up*) what has been said about the difficulties of the frontal attack meanwhile, doubts seem justified as to whether with today's Weapon effect can succeed, what the great battle emperor failed at Aspern, Wagram, Borodino and Waterloo. This does not mean that a tactical breakthrough in our time is impossible; because if it is possible, the enemy in frontal attack, so it is also possible to throw parts of his front to press. A good troupe does not get the like as one impossibility."

This is how important military heads judged the breakthrough,

*) In the works of Lieutenant General Frhrn. v. Freytag-Loringhoven.

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and the history of the world war confirmed by summer 1915 in general the verdict. Now let's put ourselves in the thoughts of the leading men of the High Command of the 11th Army in the Days before June 19th, the day of the breakthrough at magicow. The breakthrough was decided. Of course, one had before one an enemy who had been defeated many times over. However, the impression was Leaders and troops generally that this opponent is still significant possessed resilience. The verdict which the high command had formed was that the quick-wittedness of the Russian troops in the war of movement was small, that disorder in the leadership and therefore also in the troop formations ruled. The mood was bad after all the slippers. On the other hand — night marches, which are the main forces who should save Russell from the corruption of persecution, were still done well, and that's not a bad thing Sign for a Troop! None could of general dissolution be speech, rather the resistance of the opponent in developed, good position should not be underestimated. And now the enemy had such a position at his disposal, a position which he held in peace, nowhere disturbed by the enemy can prepare! Herein lies the big difference between the Gorlice—Tarnow positions and forward Lubaczow opposite the Grodek—Magerow position. The Gorlice-Tarnow position was determined by the battle situation. The Russians had theirs here at the time stop advancing on Kraków and have to dig in. In such a way the position came into being, the expansion of which as far as possible through the Austro-Hungarians in every direction had been disturbed. The troops also had emperors and kings keep Franz Joseph's important terrain points in their hands, which the Russians could not reach in this way. one was been forced to dig in where you stood. Our But troops, after thorough reconnaissance, had the attack

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from well-constructed trenches, in which the storm columns themselves were able to gather inconspicuously. The position at Przemyśl-Lubaczow was up again created in a different way. By requirement, first Przemyśl to take, and for various other reasons Mackensen's troops after moving east of Jaroslau had created a large bridgehead at the end of May, remained standing. This gave the Russians an opportunity to to sit down again and dig in in front of the 11th Army. The resulting field position could of course be completed in 14 days to 3 weeks not be expanded on a large scale. had more time but not the tsar's soldiers; as already described, the line of resistance was overthrown in mid-June. At the Grodek-Magierow position, however, they stood in front of a completely different situation. Completely undisturbed the defensive front had been so chosen by the enemy that that the

terrain was best used. All the difficulties presented by nature were thrown at the attacker. The expansion of the position itself was calm with the greatest means and the most scrupulous care. No Opponents could intervene to prevent it. Our troops lay when attacking, as we shall see, on bare earth in front of her; there was hardly time in the intended procedure that the single man by digging a foxhole to some extent could cover. That was the great difference between this position and those on the San and in western Galicia. The Army High Command had to consider the following be drawn: The troops of the 11th Army had in part fought at Gorlice-Tarnow; they had the great pursuit to the San behind them, they were at the San fights been involved and had taken Przemyśl. the the same associations were also at the breakthrough battle been employed by Lubaczow; busy days of Battle or pursuit were yet to come. Had to in this situation, it cannot be expected that the immediate Attack on the great "positia" (Russian term for position),

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in which the enemy in front of the 11th Army front, according to incoming reports, could easily unite more than 20 divisions, collapsed, where they themselves only had 16 divisions? Wasn't there a possibility that a setback would occur, that one or the other of the troops would fail? What was the consequence if this happened? Then a planned attack had to be launched. It took days, even weeks, to prepare, and the element of surprise that had played such a big role at Tarnow-Gorlice, when the 11th Army suddenly sprung up in front of the Russian front, was not at hand! The Russians, however, found time to reorganize their formations, to fill up the gaps left by heavy losses, to procure ammunition for the artillery; in short, to arrange oneself in every way. But this placed a serious obstacle in the way of the task of taking Lemberg, and the moral importance of such a Russian success should not be overlooked. But couldn't the enemy mount a powerful counterattack? The attack from the Grodek-Magierow position exposed the left flank of 11th Army to the enemy. The Russians had expanded the Tanev position so that they could counter the attack on Lemberg with a flank attack from the north. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army had not yet reached the Tanev, and probably did not reach it that quickly either. She faced fierce battles advancing against this section. The skirmishes in which this army was involved with its right wing showed the army high command that the Russians apparently did not want to give up the flank attack. But if this was successful, the Tsar's troops would be in the rear of the 11th Army! All this must be kept in mind if one wants to appreciate the decision of the army high command: "restless pursuit, immediate attack, breakthrough".

What was the goal?

First, the liberation of Lemberg. This is the moral and political success that one wants to achieve. The strategic

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The aim, however, is the destruction of the opposing enemy and the separation of the Russian forces while rolling up the Dniester front to the south towards the Romanian border and opening the Tanev position from the east, which [with the further advance of strong allied forces over this section to North, the Russian front in southern Poland had to falter. Such a prize is worth a lot of effort!

On June 13, Mackensen's High Command issued the following instructions to carry out the decision that had been made: The Imperial and Royal 2nd Army planned to work together with the enemy on a broad front (K and K V, XVIII and XIX Corps) if possible and to arrive at the Grodek position between Komarno and the northern tip of the chain of lakes east of Dobrostany and, with the K. & K. IV and the German Beskydy Corps pushed together, swinging to the south-east on both sides of Fanow, take hold behind the Grodek sector. 11th Army, right wing in the direction of Majdan-Walddorf, was to break through the enemy lines in the given offensive zone, with four army corps in the first line and another in the second line. Two army corps, under the same command, were to follow in echelon on the left, in order to secure the army against counterattacks from the north or north-east. The K. & K. 4th Army had to press on with the right wing via Lebedzie-Cewkow to the heights of Cieszanow. For the rest, their cover order remained unchanged!

The capture of Niemirow and Lubaczow, persecution. Still on the night of the 16th, the Russians retreated from the army of Boehm-Ermolli and the right wing and center of the 11th Army, feeling the impression of their new defeat suffered the day before. The planes, which took off at sunrise, reported that all the roads leading east and northeast in front of the two armies were covered with retreating columns of all arms. No more doubts; — the Tsar's soldiers tried to get in the footsteps of the great position as soon as possible. Some of the general commands had already returned there the day before. The allies soon followed. The Army High Command Boehm-Er-

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molli reported in the morning to Generaloberst v. Mackensen: "All corps in progressive pursuit." Even in front of the right wing of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army, the enemy appeared to be retreating towards Cewkow-Adamovka; on the other hand, he was still holding his lines with strong forces on the San below Dornbach.

The troops of the 11th Army had left their night positions before dawn. At first they found no lasting resistance on the right wing and in the center of the army. Soon,

however, strong cavalry forces, partly Cossacks, partly line cavalry, appeared almost everywhere, which made it very difficult for the German and Austro-Hungarian cavalry, which were much weaker, to determine the whereabouts of the enemy. In the XXXXI Reserve Corps, advance troops of the 81st and 82nd Reserve Divisions, driving enemy rearguards in front of them, reached Iaworow in the morning, through which the Russian VIII Corps had marched in the direction of Niemirow early in the morning. In the evening the divisions assembled their rifles on the line Iazow Nowy-Wola-Starzyska; directly in front of their front were dense veils of enemy cavalry. Further north, the Hungarian division of Lieutenant Field Marshal Hadfy had advanced from Livno across the upper reaches of the Zawa-dowka to Hudecki, while on its left the Galicians and Austro-Schleifiers had seen Zapust. Thus the right wing of Eleventh Army had made a powerful leap forward. Behind him the 11th Bavarian Infantry Division, which was still a reserve army, had advanced via Kalnikow-Wola Gnojnicka

Meanwhile, lively cannon fire was audible in a northerly direction. The Guards Corps had crossed the Zawadowka northwest of Wierzbiany without a fight by noon. Even stronger enemy patrols had not shown themselves. News came in from the Army High Command that Russian columns had marched on the Iaworow-Niemirow road that morning. Prince Eitel Friedrich immediately sent his divisional cavalry with artillery and machine guns into the wooded area south of Niemirow.

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(Sketch 3.) When the horsemen advanced towards the road in the early afternoon hours, they encountered enemy infantry, who immediately attacked them. A whole Russian brigade put up a fight. In a short time she was scattered in the woods. She was out of the question for Niemirow's defense. Around this little country town the Russians had drawn up a position along the road from north to south, encircling the western edge of the town, which the 2nd Guards Infantry Division and the right wing of the 43rd Reserve Division encountered towards 5 o'clock in the afternoon . At 3:15 p.m. Lieutenant-General v. Winckler: "The division takes possession of Niemirow." The forward batteries of the Guards Field Artillery and the Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 43 took up position and opened fire on the enemy fortifications. Barely two hours later, The Alexander and Elisabeth Grenadiers attacked the fortifications, the Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 204 of the 43rd Reserve Division attacked the northern part of the position to storm At about 8 pm the little town, which the Russians quickly set on fire, was ready Attacks by a Russian cavalry regiment, which tried again at 7:30 a.m. and an hour and a half later to throw the left wing of our regiments over the houses, were each time countered by the 6th battery of the reserve field artillery Bloody repulsion of Regiment No. 43. The Guards Corps spent the night near Niemirow and to the south in connection with Corps Arz -Division to rest about. The other two divisions of Korps Falkenhayn had reached Midiki and the area north of it. (Diagram 2.) The 107th

Infantry Division had deployed strongly on the left, in order to protect the flank of the Army Centre; for Emmich's corps was still significantly behind.

The 16th had turned out to be a difficult day for the left wing of 11th Army. (Sketch 4.) On the evening of the 15th, the Hanoverians encountered a very heavily manned Russian position in front of Lubaczow, which surrounded this town to the west and south.

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and was protected from the front by watercourses and marshes. The heights behind Lubaczow were also fortified in several lines. The enemy had set up a fierce resistance here and deployed Siberian troops, which are notable for their special toughness and stoic calm. As a result, during the night the 20th Infantry Division had pushed the bulk across the Lubaczowka to the area south and south-east of Lubaczow: only the Voigts-Rhetz Infantry Regiment (79th) remained south-west of the town. At 10 o'clock in the morning the bulk of the division attacked the south-east edge and the heights east of the town, the 79th Infantry Regiment attacked from the south-west. A mixed division of Dewall of the 19th Infantry Division was later to advance from Borchow, but was unable to intervene effectively in Lubaczow. Supported by the fire of the entire artillery of the Hanoverian corps, the infantry of the 20th Division worked its way through the enemy's heaviest fire.

Since General V. Emmich had reported that the sustained resistance of the enemy meant that the storming of the city was only expected in the course of the afternoon, and that what was happening further west up to the San also showed that the enemy was holding strong everywhere, the center of the 11th Army was during these hours in a not exactly favorable position. A many kilometers wide gap with confusing forest terrain gaped between the XXII. Reserve and X Army Corps. It was only insufficiently closed by the army high command given to General v. Emmich commanded the K. and 11th Honved Cavalry Division, which was moving towards the heights south-west of Reichau. If the enemy had sufficient forces at hand, then this was the right moment to advance against the left flank of Corps Falkenhayn or the right flank of the hard-fought Hanoverians. The army high command must have been all the more pleasantly surprised when the report arrived that the brave Hanoverians had already conquered Lubaczow at 1:30 p.m. and taken 1,000 prisoners. Before sunset the positions behind the

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city in their hands. Immediately advancing east to the area north-west of Reichau, they secured the left flank of the main forces of 11th Army in the evening. On the

evening of the 15th the 8th Bavarian Reserve Division had gone over to the assembled corps. To this end, the 119th Infantry Division had been pulled out and assembled around Radava behind the left wing of the army as a reserve force of the high command. Lieutenant General Freiherr v. Stein had taken command of the corps. On the evening of the 16th, the 8th reached Bavarian!» The Reserve Division broke through the edge of the forest north of Futory under heavy, heavy fighting, while the 56th Infantry Division advanced sharply to the north-east and advanced into the Kubaszyna forest, after both divisions had previously skillfully laid out and tenaciously defended Russian positions on the heights of Maslankow— Futory and at the edge of the forest further west.

Immediately to the left of the division of Major General Schach v. Wittenau fought the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian XVII. Corps. On that day, the K. & K. 4th Army had pushed back the enemy's advance troops, who were vigorously defending themselves, all along the front. The advance had stopped in front of a strong, well-manned Russian position on the line Dzikow-Cewkow-Adamovka-Dornbach (Diagram 2). June 16 had brought 11th Army a good step forward. To her right stood Boehm-Ermolli's army at the same height. Under rearguard fighters had reached in the late afternoon: K.u.K.V. Army Corps Koniuszki-Krolcwskie-Zawidowice, K.u.K. XVIII. Army Corps Szolomienice — Wolczuchy, K. u. K. XIX. Rodatyczne Corps — heights north of Tuczapy, K&K IV Corps Moloszkowice and west, and the Beskydy Corps the area south-west of the town of Szklo. In places strong detachments had already been pushed against the Wereszyca, the river whose floods had seen such hard fighting in September of the previous year. Only on the left wing of the 11th Army and in front of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's corps did the enemy still persist

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defended. Here every step forward had to be fought for; probably because the Russians did not want to give up the flank thrust or thrust in the rear of 11th Army at the given moment. On that day, in front of the allies carrying their bayonets to the east, the Russians burned down all the country towns and a large part of the villages. The testimonies of a Galician official who was liberated on June 16 by the advance of the Germans throw a significant light on the retreat tactics of the Tsarists. They said: The Russians had orders to devastate the country according to plan when retreating, in order to make it impossible for the enemy to advance. Villages and towns should be burned down, the wells filled up or poisoned; all national supplies were to be taken away by the withdrawing troops. It goes without saying that the Russians carried out this order to the fullest extent they had time. However, the time was not always given to them, but they could put the red rooster on the roof everywhere in the settlements. A match stuck into the thatched roof on the windward side of the village was enough to set the whole place ablaze. The wooden houses provided good food for the flames. - In Niemirow stood z. B., when

the guards stormed it, only one house left! According to Komarno and Grodek, the enemy had also set fire to all the larger towns immediately in front of the large "Positia", according to the airmen. This was also confirmed by statements by prisoners who claimed that the Russians wanted to take on a decisive battle here with several 100,000 men. Well, they should have the decisive battle. But it should be different [from the defense nine months ago, when the brown tide raged on Austria-Hungary At that time Nikolai Nikolayevich already saw himself standing in front of the gates of Budapest, Vienna, Prague and Breslau, and in Paris and London it was loudly announced that the steamroller was on its way to the Adriatic and the Rhine

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Part of the Russian armies in retreat for exactly 1 ½ months. Beaten in several great battles and numerous skirmishes, the tsarist armies in Galicia had lost a total of 971 officers and 391,000 men as prisoners during this period. The victor captured 304 artillery pieces, 763 machine guns and a mass of columns, trains and other war material. But Przemyśl again waved the Austro-Hungarian flag.

The battles in front of the big position.

June 17 brought no penetration into the Russian main Still in the dark of the night of June 16/17. On June 19, 1915 there had been fighting in the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army. The Austro-Hungarian XVIII. Army corps had stormed Doliniany and pushed after the retreating enemy so violently that the Imperial and Royal 102nd Infantry Regiment found itself in front of Grodek towards midnight. It attacked immediately and at 1:30 a.m. entered the western part of the city, which lies on the right bank of the Wereszyca. Further north, the Imperial and Royal IV Army Corps with parts of the Imperial and Royal 27th Infantry Division pushed forward from Moloszkowice in the direction of the chain of lakes near and north of Dobrostany, clearing several places and the heights there northeast of Moloszkowice from the enemy.

All the reports received up to the early hours of the morning confirmed that the Russians had retreated to the Wereszyca Line—Magierow—Deutschbach positions; in front of the left wing of the 11th Army and Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's right corps, he still held the heights near Cieszanow and the stretches of the Bach up to Dornbach am San. As dawn broke, the movement along the entire front of Mackensen's armies got moving again.

The Boehm-Ermolli army soon entered the fray across the board. The K. u. K. V. Corps packed with its 14th

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Infanterie-Division, leaning on the Dniester lowlands in the line Susulow-Brzezec, was still standing like a bridgehead in front of the Wereszyca, while its main body was on both sides of the Rudki-Lubien road WW. to attack. In the closest connection to it stormed the K. u. K. XVIII. Army Corps the villages west of the Wereszyca Valley. His left wing exceeded in Grodek den. section of the river and stood in heavy house-to-house fighting in the middle of the city. North of the Drozdowiecki station*) the Imperial and Royal 29th Infantry Division of the XIX. Austro-Hungarian corps the tough defender the crossing west of Cuniow, while the other two divisions of the corps advanced to the western edge of Ottenhausen and to the heavily fortified heights west of Wielkopole. The K. & K. IV Corps was still fighting on and north of the lakes of Dobrostany. On the left wing of the army, the Beskydy Corps had pushed forward impetuously through the difficult forest and hilly terrain west of Lelechowka, crossed the Wereszyca lowlands near and north of the town and joined the 35th Reserve Division on the right, the 25th Reserve Division fixed to the left on the eastern wooded bank heights. But artillery combat against the main enemy positions was in full swing. Eleventh Army also failed to penetrate the defensive system at the same time as the enemy rearguards were retreating. The terrain was difficult and the more or less strong patrols, cleverly nested in the dense forests and on the slopes, always caused new delays. The sun beat down mercilessly. The deep sand paths and narrow aisles in the wide forest zone placed high demands on the allied troops' ability to march. The infantry waded laboriously through the sea of sand; the wheels of the guns cut deep; mighty clouds of dust rose into the sky and stood still in the forest like a high wall. Man and horse threatened to die in it*) Staw Lake,

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embroider. There, where you can click on one of the numerous. hit watercourses, the bridges were found burned. They had to be restored quickly for the vehicles. It was around noon when most of the divisions approached the artillery fire range of the "Positia". The enemy showed themselves to be very alert. There could be no question of a coup de grâce against the powerful Russian defense lines Corps, K. & K. VI Corps, the Guards, the XXII Reserve and X Army Corps approached to within 2-3 km of the front line of the enemy Where the enemy had still held positions, they were snatched from him on short notice, e.g., with the Franyois Corps, Gabrielen Hill southeast of the village of Wereszyca and this place itself, with the Arz Corps, the Czarny Horb Hill The enemy was able to hold Boholotycze. The corps of Falkenhayn and Emmich were in possession of the heights north-west of Boholotycze—Smolin on both sides and Horyniec on both sides to ward off any night attacks. Before nightfall all these divisions could report that their field artillery was already in position. The heavy artillery, on the other hand, was still on the march. T. deep into the night. Of course, the difficulties of the terrain made this troop particularly difficult. The X Army Corps of General v. Emmich had had to position himself deeply

on his left wing. Finally it had to be stopped at Smolin and on the heights north of Horyniec; for to his left there was a gap five miles wide as far as Stein's assembled corps, hanging far behind. This was provisionally secured by weak detachments of the two corps. Lieutenant General Freiherr v. In the early morning Stein had followed the enemy retreating to the north-east from the Dachnow area north of the Swidnica. But he soon had to be instructed to proceed only in sections in order to complete the connection

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not to lose with the Imperial and Royal 4th Army and to secure their right wing. The Russians had not yet evacuated their positions in front of the Archduke's divisions on the morning of the 17th, but had attempted to break through during the night east of Cieplice, albeit without success. With excitement one read in the army headquarters of Generaloberst v. Mackensen the reports of the stubborn fighting that had broken out on the morning of June 17 as a result of the archduke's troops coming up again all along the line east of the San. Then in the morning the report came in that the Imperial and Royal 4th Army had stormed the strong Russian positions north-east of Cewkow and thereby broken through the enemy lines; soon afterwards they were known to be actively pursuing behind the rapidly retreating opponent. A great success! Here, too, the forward movement had started. The Imperial and Royal 4th Army pressed against the Tanev sector, which, however, could only be reached at Wolka Biska by the evening of that day. In the Tanew-San angle the Russian held tenaciously; he had also sat down again south of Tarnograd and near Cieszanow. But it was hoped that the next day the Russians would be thrown back entirely into or across the Tanev Marshes; then the danger of an enemy thrust in the rear of Eleventh Army had disappeared. So Colonel General v. Mackensen to use the two divisions, 11th Bavarian and 119th Infantry Divisions, which were at the disposal of the High Command of 11th Army to the Lipina-Zapalow area (halfway between Lubaczow and Jaroslau) to break through the Russian positions, and accordingly continue to advance move east. June 17, 1915, had nowhere brought about a break-in into the enemy's main position. Our planes reported heavy traffic on all roads behind the big position. marching columns of all arms; Combat troops are on the march to the position, trains go to the rear. The area around Lemberg, near Zolkiew and Rawa Ruska is swarming with troops -

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accumulations, and there is brisk traffic on all railway lines. In the position itself there is lively life everywhere. In many places, construction is still going on to further strengthen the fortifications. But the individual formations must be wildly mixed up, because at one point 46 men are taken prisoner during the apron fighting, and these 46 belong to no fewer than 14 different regiments! That can't do you any good when defending a strong position with a troop that has been defeated

several times. Beginning of the scheduled attack at 11th Army on 19.6. fixed. The 18.6. Nevertheless, the 11th Army could not and would not advance against the carefully developed Russian defense system without sufficient artillery preparation for an infantry attack. Generaloberst v. Mackensen therefore set the start of the planned attack for June 19. June 18 was intended to allow the infantry to get as close as possible to the main position, remove any remaining bases in the apron and carry out reconnaissance. The heavy artillery had to be brought into position. Field and foot artillery had to zero in on each other. In short, everything should be prepared so that the attack on the large position intended for the 19th hits it immediately with full force and in the right place. The Imperial and Royal 2nd Army intended on the 18th to continue the general attack on the Wereszyca line and also to encircle it from the south; for this purpose the crossing of the Dniester at Terszakow was to be enforced. The idea of a southern encirclement of the Grodek position by an advance across the Dniester by some parts of Boehm-Ermolli's army had already been expressed in the directive issued to this army on June 6 by Generaloberst v. Mackensen found; but he had been dropped again as a result of the changeful fighting in the Imperial and Royal Group Szurmayer. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's troops had to throw the enemy into the Tanev swamps on the 18th. Stein's combined corps was to move sharply east between the Swidnica and the Brusienka to the main Russian position and take cover on the Brusienka

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left for connection with the right wing of the Imperial and Royal 4th Army. the 18; June brought the right wing of the K. & K. L. army into possession of the long and hotly disputed Russian bridgehead Susulov-Brzezec in the Dniester-Wereszyca corner. In Grodek the battle progressed slowly but favorably, and the Beskydy corps advanced on the enemy positions at Stawki and Maidan. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's corps were almost entirely able to carry out their task. The Russians put up a longer resistance, lasting well into the night, at the crossings north of Tarnograd and south of Ulanow. The defender also put up a tough fight on the heights north-east of Cieszanow. From here he even counterattacked the left wing of Stein's combined corps. This had a rough day pushing into the obtuse angle made by the Russian defenses at Deutschbach. The 8th Bavarian Reserve Division was able to take the village of Swidnica [mrd the heights northeast of it only after extremely bloody struggles. The 3rd Russian Guards Division retreated only gradually to the large position. In the evening the left wing of the corps was close to Deutschbach and south of Oseredek. The preparations for the attack and the approach of the infantry had gone according to plan in the other formations of 11th Army. But everywhere, fighting had taken control of the heights directly in front of the "large position". After a violent struggle, the Guards had cleared Boholotycze of the enemy, and the 44th Reserve Division had stormed Castle Wysiecz, which was directly in front of the position. (Sketch 5.) The enemy infantry had remained very calm in the main position, but the defender's artillery, which was already active on

the afternoon of the 17th, was firing very vigorously would come into action than had been accustomed to observing him of late.

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The reconnaissance showed everywhere that the Russian positions were tactically well selected and technically well developed. The troops had a hard job ahead of them. "It costs a lot of blood" was the general impression at first sight of the powerful fortifications. Everywhere, therefore, the reconnaissance of the attack targets and the attack area, the advancement of machine guns, mortars and flanking guns were carried out with zeal and the greatest care. The situation was managed by liaison officers. The great successes of the last few weeks gave the German-Austrian-Hungarian corps the firm confidence that they could also attack those in front of them. The task at hand would be happily solved. There was absolute certainty of victory in the 11th Army, from the foremost security line to the army high command strong troop accumulations reported in the Rawa Ruska area. Generaloberst v. Mackensen therefore had General v. Emmich commissioned to take over the cover of the left army flank against Rawa Ruska with the X and combined corps as well as the K. and 11. Honved Cavalry Division. The instructions issued in the afternoon for the next day's breakthrough specified: XXXXI. Reserve, K. u. K. VI., Guard and XXII. Reserve Corps breakthrough through the line Majdan-Alicko-Seredkiewicz to the road Lemberg-Rawa Ruska with the intention of separating the enemy forces, attack strip: (see Sketch 2), as army reserves 11th Bavarian Division to Starzyska (west-southwest of Majdan), 119th Infantry Division according to Niemirow.

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General v. Emmich was to provide a strong attacking group behind the right wing of his sector. This had the impact of the XXII. Reserve Corps to advance further after the breakthrough and at the same time to cover the left flank. The K. and 11th Honved Cavalry Division had to be ready to advance in a north-easterly direction through any gap that might appear. In the area east and north-east of Eieszanow, the Austro-Hungarian XVII. Army Corps of the Imperial and Royal 4th Army to be ready to attack to support the north-east thrust of the 11th Army's left wing by advancing on Narol Miasto. The Boehm-Ermolli army was to continue the attack in the current direction, pushing the enemy eastwards while taking Lemberg and then rolling up the Dniester front. Large, clear tasks were set for the armies, broad goals set for them. We want to summarize them again briefly! Army Boehm-Ermolli opening the Wereszyca line, taking Lemberg, throwing back the Russians to the east and south-east, rolling up the Dniester front. 11th Army Breakthrough with the mass between Majdan and Ulicko-Seredkiewicz, driving back the enemy across the Lemberg-Rawa Ruska road in a north-easterly direction, dividing the enemy front; Gruppe Emmich covering the left flank, advancing with a focus on the right wing to

help Korps Falkenhayn forward if necessary; 11th Honved Cavalry Division ready to advance northeast through a gap that might arise. 4th Imperial and Royal Army with right wing advancing on Narol Miasto in order to increase pressure to the north-east following Emmich Group, otherwise cover on the Tanew and San fronts. If these goals were to be achieved, everyone had to do their best; everything had to work together smoothly. The night hours crept by like snails!

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The breakthrough at magicow. We don't want to hear about generals who conquer without human blood. If the bloody slaughter is a terrible spectacle, then that should only be a reason to appreciate the wars more, but not to make the swords that are wielded gradually duller out of humanity, until once again someone comes in between with a sharp, who cuts our arms off our bodies. (v Clausewitz, "Vom Kriege".) The dawn heralds the approaching day; it was quiet throughout the night in front of the Mackensen army, hardly that a patrol shot was fired here and there. The Russians sat in their trenches and waited for the Things to come.—Does he expect the attack today? Hardly! The Germans can't have finished their preparations for attacking such a position as this. The field artillery has been in position and hacking since the day before yesterday since yesterday on the wire obstacles; here and there in the evening salutes from the heavy artillery came across, a sign that they have arrived despite the difficulties of the terrain. But the ammunition for such a big attack can't be there yet, and the mass of the Germans Yesterday the infantry was still a good distance from the trenches, so there is probably still time to bring in the reinforcements gathering near Tomaszow and up in Poland to let them advance in time to push Mackensen in the back. At least something has to be done now, because the left wing of Mackensen's troops is advancing too quickly. Thus, on the night of the 19th, lively night skirmishes broke out among Emmich's flank protection troops. There the corps of Generalleutnant Freiherr v. After hot fighting, Stein reached the heights before Deutschbach late in the evening of the 18th with the 56th Infantry Division. The enemy prepared to counterattack against this troop. With great masses he grabbed under cover of darkness. What prospects if he ran the division over the mounds and thus penetrated the flank protection of the 11th Army

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bumped! But his will is in vain. He is flatly rejected, and the same thing happens several times until, around 2 a.m., he gives up his unsuccessful attempt. After 3 o'clock in the morning it starts to dawn. The rising sun greets calm fronts; nothing predicts things to come. But wait, the German infantry is almost everywhere within storming distance of the enemy. But hardly a shot is fired. A few fliers are circling in the air like birds of prey. And over there, north of Magierow, there stands a smoky pine tree like a threatening fist, created from the flames of a village. Otherwise it is

peaceful and quiet. The sun's rays play with the waves of Lake Maidan and glide over the heights. There they scurry through the cornfields, jump over the sandy paths and lose themselves in the coniferous forest, in which a light wind carries the smoke plumes of the bivouac fires rising here and there into the distance. The lark climbs towards the sun and sings its song; a few swallows sail around the few little huts that the Cossack spared, and over in the deciduous forest a few kingfishers show off their beautiful plumage. But everything is covered with a clear morning air that gives a wide view and gives the eye plenty of light and shade, which sees the outlines of the Russian trenches and loopholes as if drawn with a pen. There! At 5 a.m. the German artillery suddenly roared along the entire front! Howling, whirring, hissing, the shells of all batteries rushed towards the Russian positions, where they burst with a loud crack. Soon the air is booming, buzzing and shaking. Death and destruction lay over the Russian trenches. In vain did the tsar's engineering officers do their best to expand the position. The shells of the field and heavy artillery ruthlessly tear their work into ruins. The steel fist smashes the neatly laid loopholes and coverings, tears down the walls of the trenches, killing, wounding, burying the defenders. And the fire is getting stronger and stronger! At around 6 a.m. the Russian positions can hardly be seen; huge clouds of dust and smoke mark the places where they are.


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So the German artillery raged for two hours, spewing doom, against the enemy front, whose guns initially aimed the fire only weakly at one or the other battery. A lack of ammunition forces us to economize there for the decisive moment, and—it seems to be drawing near. Reinforcements were already rushing everywhere towards the attacking positions of the attackers, now individuals, now groups. Now it's time for the Russian artillery to show off, and they do it with power and skill. At 7 a.m. the artillery battle reached its greatest intensity. The moment has come for the German infantry to attack. But everywhere in the storm positions there is stirring; thin lines rush forward from them. — The sun now burns hotly on the battlefield. - It was about seven o'clock in the morning when the front lines of the 2nd Guards Infantry Division began to charge. (Sketch 5.) During the night, with great difficulty, they had worked their way to within 3-300 m of the enemy position. The Elizabeth Garde Grenadiers found themselves in a very uncomfortable position 300 m from the enemy. Their front position was on the road leading from Wulisko to Boholotycze. The 6th and 7th companies of the regiment had been able to nest here with difficulty. The trail runs consistently along the swamp stretch that stretches in front of Hill 345 and has rocky ground. It thus formed the outermost frontier towards the enemy, where it was still possible to dig in, because the swamp area begins immediately on the other side of the path. What else could the good grenadiers do but dig their foxholes in the stone floor as best they could during the few hours of night? It is easy to imagine that they did not get very far with this, and so they were forced to lie almost openly in the open country from sunrise to awaiting their hour of storm. The Russian artillery settled! don't miss the glorious

goal. From 6 o'clock in the morning they laid heavy shell and light shrapnel fire on the position in Weg, which soon tore sensitive gaps among the stormtroopers. It seemed like a relief to those when shortly after 7 a.m. the company commanders gave the order to attack. Like lightning

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were the people high; impetuously they rushed forward. But at Hill 345 the Russians have not yet lost their nerve even under the heavy fire of our artillery, which has wreaked havoc in their ranks. The stormers from the first and the second Russian trench overlying this storey-like part were met with hellish infantry and machine gun fire. Not enough with that, heavy machine gun flank fire from the area immediately behind W. fj. a. This and the brisk, timely uninterrupted barrage of the Russian artillery tear down many a brave grenadier. Melted together, completely out of breath from running across the swamp field, the companies reach the area 100 m before the barricade, where they throw themselves down to catch their breath. But the wild fire makes a longer rest at this point impossible. So forward! Support is already coming from behind. So the attackers are lying around 8 a.m. in front of the Russian wire entanglement.



Meanwhile, the supporters worked their way forward and reached the comrades lying at the wire obstacles, who they found cutting through the wire. It is true that the artillery worked quite well in these obstacles; but almost everywhere the tangle of torn wires is still hanging together, sometimes quite tangled. Therefore, here, in the face of the enemy barely 100 m away without terrain cover, tedious work must be done


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be performed. However, our batteries are not idle. Some have already changed positions forward and, as far as possible, are holding down the Russians in their trenches with heavy fire. New reinforcements appear. They join the attackers at the obstacles, who have now made their way through the wire tangle and are in a firefight with the toughly defending opponent. But not for long! Suddenly the rifle lines jump up and rush towards the Russian trench. The bayonets of the grenadiers flash brightly in the sun! The quickest are already at the Russian trench when the nerves of the Russians collapse. They swung themselves in droves without weapons, waving white handkerchiefs, onto the parapet, gave themselves up, organized themselves and, always carrying white flags in front of them, marched towards the encroaching support of the Elizabethans. The stormtroopers meanwhile are already beyond the first ditch and are climbing up to the second, which is also taken after a short struggle. 200 Russian dead are counted in the trenches! At 6:20 a.m. the heroic attack of the Elizabeth Guard Grenadiers had already carried the stormtroopers up to the crest of the hill. Here, however, they encounter a previously unrecognized third trench line, against which they immediately prepare to attack, only to be their master an hour later. In the meantime, the commander of the regiment, Colonel Boehm, after storming the two front lines of the trench, had the left wing turned north in order to give way to the attack of the heavily struggling Alexander regiment. This, like the following regiments of the 43rd Reserve Division, had to overcome difficulties similar to those of the Elizabethans. The conditions here were even more unfavorable in that the marshland in front of the front was considerably wider; the assault position could not therefore have been pushed so close to the enemy. In front of the wire obstacles there were also huge branches made with great skill.

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As soon as the Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadiers and, to their left, the 204th Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 43rd Reserve Division set out from Boholotycze to attack, wild fire from the front started here too, which was punctuated by uninterrupted machine gun fire and soon was also reinforced by artillery fire from the left flank from the Lipnik area. On the uncovered swamp plain, every single man was clearly visible. No wonder that significant failures occurred very quickly! Nevertheless, the 1st Battalion of the Alexander Regiment soon advanced to the Astverhau; it began to wind through here. However, the raging fire cost constantly increasing losses. The supports, too, have already come to the fore in a strongly fused state. Help is coming from the Elisabeth flank! The Russians still hold the inn (W.H.), but at height 345 and on the north slope they are beginning to give way. You can already see whole groups running backwards. There's no stopping the Alexander Grenadiers! What has overcome the obstacles rushes forward. After a short, fierce struggle, at 9:30 a.m. the strong base of W. H. was in their hands. Those who do not want to be captured by the Russians are killed or try to escape by

fleeing. The rear area, however, is under the powerful action of the guns of the 2nd Guards Field Artillery Brigade, which has had a light field howitzer battery of the 2nd Guards Field Artillery Regiment on the western slope of Hill 345 since 9 o'clock in the morning fetched their limbs.



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The advance of the Alexander under Colonel v. Bismarck now gives the 204th Reserve Infantry Regiment a head start, which under heavy fire has to work its way through the barricades and wire entanglements in front of it. Thus, at 10 a.m., these brave men successfully stormed the triple row of trenches north of W.H., despite the heavy flank fire from the north. Now the left wing of the regiment makes a northward front to help the comrades of the 203rd regiment forward. Despite the direct effect of flanking artillery and machine gun fire coming from the Lipnik area, they are trying to gain ground. The attack advances slowly. Though the enemy holds his front. But as a result of the joint attack of the two German reserve regiments in front and flank, with parts of the 44th Reserve Division to the north also intervening, he had to surrender Mazury Szczerczhk at 11 am. He was all the more tenacious in holding the Grabniki rear position at height 323. It almost seemed as if the attack by the young Brandenburg regiments was coming to a standstill. Then Lieutenant-Colonel Launhard, the artillery commander of the 43rd Reserve Division, shortly after 11 o'clock in the morning throws the 2nd Division Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 43 in front of them. Brief, heavy fire at Hill 323 and with one battery on the flanking trenches at Lipnik—Mialkowy Kat)—then, by order of its commander, Colonel Koch, Reserve Regiment 203 stormed. In brisk advance the strong high position was taken around noon, while at the same time Regiment 204 snatched Grabniki from the Russians. At 1:30 p.m. Regiment 203 has Mialkowy Kat in its hands. Twelve hundred prisoners are the booty of the two Brandenburg regiments. It was now possible to help the 44th Reserve Division, which was engaged in a fierce struggle against Lipnik—we shall return to this struggle below—and to follow

the Guards, which were briskly advancing eastward. When the Elizabethans entered the third ditch at 9:30 a.m

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behind the ridge 343 and advanced with their main forces to the east in the direction of the hill 310, they already met their right connection here, the Kaiser Franz Garde-Grenadier-Regiment No. 2, which had taken up position at the same time as them, in a dashing manner Stompe took Mazury and advanced his attack against 310. It wrested this high position from the Russians shortly after 10 a.m. This opened the way to magicow! Just one and a half hours later, the regiments of the 2nd Guards Infantry Division, as Lieutenant General v. Winckler was reported to have overrun the Russian positions at Mielnikov Garb. They are advancing on the town and the high forts north of it, while batteries of the 4th Guards Field Artillery Regiment are about to take up positions on the Mielnikov Garb to support the infantry attack. Two hours later, Magierow is in the hands of the Guard. During these events the 1st Guards Infantry Division under its commander Prince Eitel Friedrich had to survive fierce fighting. Their attack terrain was quite confusing; a thorough artillery preparation was almost impossible in the wooded terrain. A number of strong bases lay in front of the main Russian position, and the main position itself was partly protected by obstacles along the Biala stream. In the individual wooded areas in front of the position, wide obstacle zones were created by felled trees, etc.; deep ravines lay in the front, and the Russians pounded them with machine guns all along their length. Nevertheless, the 2nd Guards Infantry Brigade on the north wing had advanced towards 8 a.m. to the creek north of Piaskowa and the church in this place, while the 1st and 3rd Guards Regiment e.g. F. then worked their way south to the crest 293. But then the attack came to a halt. It was necessary to wait until the 2nd Guards Infantry Division had advanced far enough, since a frontal assault on the protected by the marshy creek lowlands


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position at that time would have cost too much blood. The first task of the artillery was to keep the main Russian position under heavy fire. The tenacity with which the enemy defended itself is shown by the fact that the success of the right wing of the 2nd Guards Infantry Division at Hill 310 initially had no effect on the Russian front at Piaskowa. It was only around noon that the 2nd Guards Infantry Brigade, following the Franz Regiment on the left, was able to advance further. The removal of the position succeeds. At 1:30 p.m. the whole gorge area near Piaskowa was in the hands of the 1st Guards Infantry Division, which continued to advance briskly. An hour later the fortifications at Hill 324 have been stormed and we continue east. In the morning, the Austro-Hungarian corps on their right met resistance that was just as tough as the Guards. (Sketch 6.) In his combat zone lay the fortress-like Horodysko Mountain, surrounded by a wild gorge. Here, too, the attack comes to a

standstill after gaining some ground. The Horodysko could only be seized from the south when the K. and 39th Honved Infantry Divisions succeeded in penetrating the Sosnia Forest after 10 a.m. Thus, after a heavy struggle, he was taken away at 12:30 p.m., gaining numerous prisoners. This frees the way to the east for the Galicians and Hungarians as well. At this time, stubborn fighting was raging on the right wing of the 11th Army. Here stood the young troops of the XXXXI. Reserve Corps under heavy fire after magnificent initial successes. As early as 7:43 am the 81st Reserve Division had taken the group of houses north-east of Reczki, protected by swampy terrain, and immediately afterwards, thanks to the efficient work of the artillery and mortars, stormed the position at 339. Fifteen minutes later Stelmachy was in the hands of Major-General v. Lagging. As booty 900 prisoners!

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The success is immediately exploited ruthlessly. The 1st and 2nd Battalion of the Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 267 [Üoßen in one platoon up to Hill 356 and take this position.



Terrain over which the R.I.-R. 267 took place. Here the 7th Company finds itself directly in front of a fully combat-capable Russian battery. In no time at all the stormers are between the guns. The glorious booty is in their possession! Anything that doesn't come from your gunners will be slaughtered. 4 guns, 4 ammunition wagons and 70 men to operate are the success! Reserve Infantry Regiment 268, meanwhile, was working under heavy fire against the heavily fortified and stubbornly held Pod Capem. But before this could be achieved, everything came to a standstill; — the Russian launched a strong counterattack. Earth-colored floods surge towards the attacker in great breadth and depth. Dense columns advancing at Pod Capem against 268th Regiment collapse under powerful, well-directed artillery fire from 81st Reserve Field Artillery Brigade. There was therefore no infantry fighting here, but it did at Hill 356, where the 267th Regiment had to tenaciously defend its prey. There, in order to regain his battery, the Russians launched strong counterattacks from the east and north, repeated several times, with dense masses. Only around noon does he stop his attempts after everything has been in vain. Only mountains of Russian corpses remain. Now the 81st Reserve Division had a free hand again.

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Its sister division, the 82nd, facing the Maidan Sea, had not yet found an opportunity for decisive action. The storm against the enemy position had to be advanced through the marsh zone west of the village of Maidan. However, large stretches of the swamp area were as good as completely impassable. The division's infantry therefore had to advance to the few places where advance was at all possible; but these narrow waves were naturally under the sharpest concentrated enemy fire. It is understandable that not much has been achieved here. There was no prospect of faster success until the left wing of Boehm-Ermolli's army, the German Beskydy Corps, attacked. But this was only planned for the afternoon*). , Let us now turn our attention to the left wing of the 11th Army. (Diagram 5.) Here the 44th Reserve Division, connected to Runckel's Division, had a completely uncovered plain in front of it from its forward position to the Russian line. But the markers worked their way across this until the afternoon, with great losses, close to the enemy's obstacles. The southern wing of the division was able to take part in the taking of Mazury Szczerczyk at 11 a.m.**). Further north one cannot advance any further frontally. The reserve infantry regiments 205 and 206 suffered badly under strong artillery flank fire from the direction of Kowale. An encirclement from the south is not possible, since the gorge between Mazury Szczerczyk and Lipnik is under constant, effective longitudinal fire from the Russians. However, when the progress made by the neighbor on the right continued to increase, the opponent, who showed no sign of letting up in his resistance, was attacked again. After overcoming the obstacles, at about 2 p.m. they attacked Hill 342, which was taken immediately afterwards. In a bloody struggle Lipnik was snatched from the enemy, and soon the rear position at height 315 was in the hands of the division. *) p. 67. **) p. 60.

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Meanwhile, the 107th Infantry Division of Major General v. At 11:30 am Moser scaled and stormed the heavily fortified Tuczna Gora; after which they had turned against the strong positions at Kowale-323-Hills north of Stary Dwor, and there victoriously planted their colors just before 3 PM. Thus the attack of the 11th Army's shock group on the southern front was valid. The Guards, to the north the 43rd Reserve Infantry Division, to the south the K.u.K.VI. Corps and the 81st Reserve Infantry Division had already broken through; all but the 81st Division were marching east. Now the 44th Reserve Infantry Division and the 107th Infantry Division could follow. The General of the Infantry Freiherr v. Plettenberg had been placed under the 119th Infantry Division by the army reserves in order to make full use of his successes. He had instructed his divisions to remain in uninterrupted [offense to]. The Guard pushed the wedge farthest to the east, fighting. Shortly before 6 o'clock in the evening the 2nd Guards Infantry Division stood with its

spearheads in front of the Russian intermediate position at Lavrykov and attacked it. After a short, fierce battle, she took possession of her before sunset at about 9 o'clock in the evening. (Sketch 2.) Advance guards advanced almost to the railroad. This had reached the 1st Guards Infantry Division further south. In the afternoon Prince Eitel Friedrich's regiments had broken down enemy resistance at Hill 263 east of Magierow. Shortly after 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the division had quickly attacked Horodzow with the 2nd Guards Regiment z. F. taken. From there it drove patrols against the Lemberg-Rawa Ruska railway. Since the planes had reported that there was still heavy traffic on the runway that afternoon, they had to get hold of it as soon as possible. Therefore, a detachment of the 1st Guards Engineers and the 1st Guards Regiment z. F. against the railroad. she met

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attacked Dobrosin station on fire and blew up the tracks 400 m north of it, thereby preventing traffic. At 11 p.m. the 1st Guards Infantry Division, leaning on the Mala, the 2nd Guards Regiment z. F. in Horodzow, security detachments advanced to the east, the 4th Guards Regiment z. F. with outpost already between the railway and the main road in the village of Dobrosin. The 1st Guards Regiment had thrown its foremost detachments south along the road to the west exit of the burned-down village of Pily. From here the 3rd Guards Regiment was echeloned to the right, echeloned backwards to Kunin. F. to cover the flank. Arz's Corps had reached Kunin with the 12th Infantry Division and the 12th Infantry Division and Iarosze with the 39th Honved Infantry Division and the heights southwest of it. So it was also staggered backwards to the right, because the XXXXI. Reserve Corps was still heavily dependent. This corps had been engaged in the heaviest fighting throughout the afternoon. (Sketch 6.) After repelling the violent Russian attacks*), the Reserve Infantry Regiment 268 entered Pod Capem at 4 o'clock in the afternoon after a hot struggle, constantly flanked by the fire of numerous machine guns built into the Krolowa Gora. This heavily fortified eminence, which commanded all the country in front of it, must fall ere the attack could be advanced farther east. Therefore, in the evening, the 268th Regiment, advancing on Pod Capem at Hill 327, and the 269th Regiment, advancing on Stary Dwor, attacked. At 8 o'clock Hill 327 was stormed by the 268 regiment and Krolowa Gora by the 269 regiment, while the 267 regiment took possession of the Borek forest. After 13 hours of hard struggle, the exhausted battalions were no longer able to advance any further. It had been too hot a day for her. Happily, their heroism was rewarded with a booty of 1700 prisoners and 4 pieces of artillery. During these battles the 82nd Reserve Division had worked its way so far through the marshland that in the afternoon *) p. 63.

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could take the sawmill by the lake. Shortly before that, a base west of Majdan had also fallen. But now the division was in a position that could hardly be taken in a frontal attack. The only way to get to the main position was via the two buttresses, the barriers of which were in your hands. This was protected by a 6 m wide wire obstacle and was built into a steep rock face 25 to 30 m above the swamp area. Nothing helped. In the few hours until sunset one had to content oneself with holding the barriers. The next day could bring the decision, since the 81st Reserve Division advanced comprehensively from the north and the Beskydy Corps from the south. The frontal attack would have cost unnecessary victims. (Sketch 2.) The Beskid corps had according to the orders of General v. Boehm-Ermolli only started his attack after 2 p.m. While the southern wing of the army was forced to cross the Wereszyca near the mouth and attacked the wooded heights east of it, while the Imperial and Royal 9th Infantry Division took the whole of Grodek into their hands after a two-day struggle and ready to attack against line 316-313, a strong concentrated artillery mass opened up overwhelming fire on the Russian positions in the Wereszyca knee and to the north. Until deep into the night lasted at the K. u. K. XIX. and IV Corps wrestling. It was not possible here to snatch the heights between Ottenhausen-Wielkopole and the Wereszyca from the enemy and throw him behind the sector. At 4 a.m. on June 20, the hotly contested hilltops west of Stradcz were successfully taken away; Ianow also fell into the hands of the attackers. The decision had already been forced upon the Beskydy Corps on the afternoon of the 19th. Around 5 p.m. his leader, General der Kavallerie von. der Marwitz, His Majesty received the German Kaiser on the battlefield of his corps, which was with the 33rd Reserve Division

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under Lieutenant General V. Schmettau broke into the fortifications at Stawki in a mighty charge. Shortly afterwards, the heavily developed Bulava outpost of the 25th Reserve Division and the front between the two points of the 35th Reserve Division also fell victim. Before nightfall, this division advanced slightly east across the captured position, while the 25th Reserve Division prepared to swing north to support the 82nd Reserve Division. The Austro-Hungarian units of the Boehm-Ermolli Army succeeded in severe night-fighting in some areas to extend the successes of June 19 considerably and to gain a firm footing in the main Russian position. So was in the night of 19/20. June 1915 the situation between Dniester and Biala. Meanwhile, in the north, the 43rd Reserve Division of Major General v. Following the 2nd Guards Infantry Division, Runckel advanced after a few rearguard battles to the eastern slope of the Okopy Heights (Sketch 5) and, to protect their left flank, echeloned themselves backwards via Szalaputy. The heavily fortified Okopy Heights had been ceded to the division without a fight. Our brave troops rightly admired the careful work of fortifications that they found here. What must the Russians look like when they gave up this position without a fight! To the north, the 44th Reserve Division reached Zabawa and the terrain east and north of the

town, while the 107th Infantry Division took over flank protection in the Za Gumienkami—Manasterek line. — General V. Emmich's troops (Xth and combined corps) today stood still in accordance with orders to cover the left flank of the army. (Diagram 2.) Only its strong right wing, especially the 20th Infantry Division, advanced in line with the advance of the 107th Division after the Russian positions had been taken, up to the forest south-west of Dabrowka and to the Pod Luhem area. In this exhibition the troop faced north and stayed put.

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Otherwise, the divisions of v. Emmichs prepared for the attack that was to hit the north wing of the large position the next day, June 20. The Russians were providing strong forces there, according to the patrols. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army had remained essentially unchanged. June 19 had brought the 11th Army a tremendous success. For the fourth time since the offensive movement began in Galicia they had won a great breakthrough battle.* On a front of almost 30 km the Russian positions protected by nature and built like fortresses had been stormed without the army reserves having been deployed still at Starzyska, the 119th Infantry Division around magicow. That's where the K. and 11th Honved Cavalry Division had also been brought in. The Guards Corps had already taken a swinging thrust from the road and railway Lemberg at a depth of 16 km - Rawa Ruska was laid, thus severing an important connection between the fortress and the Russian rear n flank by the 43rd and 44th Reserve Divisions, on their right by the Austro-Hungarians of Field Marshal Lieutenant v. doctor protected. Even strong Russian counterattacks against this advanced wedge could be calmly awaited. But the Russian did not think of attacking. With what should he go on to counter-attack? A significant part of his troops were partly captured and partly destroyed by the new blow of the 11th Army. What was still in front of the front was just enough to protect against further surprises during the night. No help could come from the south. Every man was needed to fend off Boehm-Ermolli's army, which had been attacking since the afternoon. And in the north? Yes, reinforcements are said to be gathering in the Lublin area, 100 km north-northwest of Tomaszow; but they can take days to take effect. However, everything seems to indicate that the *) On May 2, May 24, June 13, and June 19, 15

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left wing of 11th Army will advance east tomorrow, June 20th. That must be prevented. In addition, the last reserve, the XXIII collected by Tomaszow. Corps deployed, of whose 3rd Guards Division considerable parts had already been thrown against the 56th Infantry Division on the night of the 18th/19th*). June 20, 1915. When the instructions for June 20 had to be issued at Mackensen's Army Headquarters, the picture of the situation gained on the basis of the available reports was still very unclear. Wan only knew that the shock group of the 11th Army had broken through the Russian positions on a broad front and that the Guards and

the K. & K. VI. Army corps were rapidly advancing east. It seemed as if strong parts of the defeated enemy were retreating to the north-east. But the bulk of the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army was still stuck in heavy fighting on the Wereszyca; It was not yet known whether the fortified Leniberg would be tenaciously defended by the Russians, or whether the enemy might even counter-attack from the fortress belt. Some reports spoke of hostile concentrations near Rawa Ruska. So restraint seemed necessary for the 11th Army's most advanced corps. The Imperial and Royal 2nd Army therefore had to instruct the Beskydy Corps to proceed as far as the Lemberg-Rawa Ruska road as part of their previous mission. Of the corps of the 11th Army, the divisions of General v. Francois to continue their forward movement in the previous battle strip, the K. u. K. VI. and the Guards Corps not to go beyond the Lemberg-Rawa Ruska railway line and only to advance advance troops to the highway. The XXII. Reserve Corps should also reach the railway with its right wing, and echelon the left to the Kamionka-Starawies area. Subsequently, the Army Group Emmich had to take possession of the line Dabrowka—Südende Potylicz—(Smfmgen —A357—Westrand Deutschbach, while the K. and K. 4th Army extended its right wing to the line Oseredek—Hohe 229 advanced north of Zukow-Lubliniec Street and otherwise on Tanew-San ~ *) p.

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secured. Generaloberst v. Mackensen did not want to advance further to the east with the 11th Army, but wanted to pursue the retreating enemy to the north with the strongest possible forces of this army, echeloned to the left, after it had been clarified whether and which parts, following the northern wing of the Boehm-Ermolli Army, would comprehensive action against the northern front of Lemberg had to be used. Meanwhile, the K. and 11th Honved Cavalry Division were to advance towards the Zolkiew-Mosty Wielkie road, which was important for the Russian retreat threatened to push the Russians holding the 82nd Reserve Division, they retreated that night, but not unnoticed by the troops of the XXXXI. Reserve Corps. They immediately took up the pursuit and pushed so energetically that by 11 a.m. on the 20th they had their advance guards in front of the connection point in the north of Lemberg, specifically in the area of the Skwarzawa-Nova lignite mine (x) near Glinsko . By 3 p.m. the main forces had developed about half a mile from this position. At first they stayed where they were because investigations had shown that it was an extremely strong fortification system. Three ditches, stacked one above the other, secured by wide wire obstacles, fended off the advancing. Nothing was to be desired here without sufficient artillery preparation. The field artillery had just started up and was able to zero in before evening. But the heavy artillery could not arrive before nightfall. So the presentation of the attack had to be postponed to the 21st. In the meantime the Beskydy corps had worked its way to the Rokitno-Vk.-Polani area, fighting rear guards. In the evening advance troops were pushed forward as far as the southern parts of the northern annex in the direction of

Zarudce-Wiesenberg. North of Corps Franyois the divisions of the K. & K. VI. Corps repelled several Russian counterattacks during the night.

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In line with the XXXXI. Reserve Corps they too had advanced further. Northeast Lipniki and on the western edge of the forest south of Pily the enemy threw themselves against them again. He was cut off bloody. But here, too, strong Russian entrenchments prevented advance to the railway. In spite of this, the right flank of the Guards Corps now appeared completely secure. The 1st and 4th Guards Regiment z. F. had initially made progress near Dobrozin and south, but had then had to fend off uninterrupted advances by strong Russian masses; the 1st Division of the 3rd Guards Field Artillery Regiment had played a major role in this. Around 6 o'clock in the afternoon the opponents stopped their completely useless beginning. Now the 1st G a r d e - R e g i m e n t z. F. after; his Fusilier battalion took Pily. The bulk of the 2nd Guards Infantry, Di Vision, had advanced from Lavrykov against the railway in the morning and had encountered strong enemy resistance there near Horajec. The enemy then held the railroad to the north-east with stronger forces as far as the area of the 43rd Reserve Division. It seemed expedient to stop the attack. wait until the neighboring division was ready to attack. At 10:00 a.m. Zuszki had been assigned this by the 204th Reserve Regiment under Colonel Freiherr v. buttlar occupied; Soon after, Maldryki was in the hands of the 203rd Reserve Regiment. Behind them came the division's field artillery. Shortly after 1 o'clock in the afternoon the 6th Battery Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 43 began a well-placed, heavy direct fire on the enemy positions on the roadbed. Two hours later, when the infantry advanced on the railway embankment and were not yet within 300 m, the Russians got up from their trenches, raising their hands, and ran over, shouting "Don't shoot artillery, don't shoot artillery". Without themselves Having suffered appreciable casualties, the division had at one blow 800 prisoners!A considerable number of dead and wounded Russians, who had fallen victim to the fire of the 6th battery, lay on the railway embankment.

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Shortly thereafter, the 3rd Guards Insanteric Brigade took Horajec and advanced by rail and road *). As a result, the Lemberg-Rawa Ruska road was firmly in the hands of the allies over a width of 10 km. In the latter town, however, there had been a strong detachment of the 19th Infantry Division since that morning, which had driven the Russians back to a height of 270 m north of Rawa Ruska after the enemy in front of it, like the front of the 20th Division, had attacked them early in the morning which retreats had begun. Otherwise, the left wing of the XXII. Reserve Corps and X Army Corps held in the ordered line on the heights north-west of Maldryli—Dabrowka—Einsingen, without opposing any opponents. The situation was quite different in the case of the Stein Corps. It had gone on the attack in the

morning. The Tsar's 3rd Guards Division was not willing to give up their trenches for free! A hard fight developed between them and the 8th Bavarian Reserve Division, which snatched Hill 357 south-east of Deutschbach from them at 3 p.m. Nevertheless, the Russians did not retreat, but rather threw new heavy artillery into the battle. The Bavarians had to fight their way through ditch after ditch, suffering great losses. Only when the sun went down did the Russian strength break! They fled back when the 56th Infantry Division took Deutschbach with a charging hand. 2,500 prisoners and eleven machine guns were the reward for the hard work of the Stein Corps. The Austro-Hungarian 4th Army then pushed its lines further at Oseredek and used its main forces to tie up the Russians standing in front of it in their position behind the Tanew, which the Imperial and Royal troops now reached everywhere from Olchowiec to the mouth of the river. Another day of great success! Above all, the generous breakthrough of Mackensen's 11th Army on 19/20 June enabled the K. & K. 2nd Army to carry their attack to under the walls of the Lemberg Fortress, at the northern end of which the German artillery was nibbling on the evening of the 20th.

*) The 119th Infantry Division was led by General Freiherr v. Plettenberg not used, she remained in Magierow.

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In the north, Rawa Ruska was in the hands of the allies, who had now overrun the entire Grodek-Magierow position. Mackensen's plan, the separation of the Russian forces, seemed to be realizing. The Russian front flew north and east at the point of penetration. All air reports left no doubt about it. Patrol reports also confirmed this. The main forces of the Russians were retreating to the north. Between Rawa Ruska and Tomaszow alone the ruins of five Russian corps were rightly suspected. Three more corps were stationed on either side of Zolkiew, and another three corps near and south of Lemberg. If a new attack succeeded in throwing the Russian formations standing at Zolkiew as defenders of the position leaning against Lemberg's northern front, they had to be pushed in one direction or the other, and the separation was complete. The case of Lviv. (Sketches 1 and 2.) On June 20, the two army commanders issued the following instruction to Generaloberst v. Mackensen decreed: "The operation, which is now being carried out so successfully, has Colonel-General v. carry out Mackensen with the 4th, 11th and 2nd armies until the capture of Lemberg; at the same time the dissolution of the enemy retreating in a northerly direction by attacking where he positions himself must be completed. Group Szurmay is now subordinate to 2nd Army. The Southern Army had to cross the Dniester and advance towards the area east of Lemberg. The 7th Army advances across the Dniester, secures the right flank and the unconditional possession of Czernowitz." In addition, a note from the German Supreme Army Command arrived at Mackensen's army headquarters, according to which Colonel-General von Mackensen would soon be with the 11th Army - without 4 divisions to

be surrendered to the west — and the Imperial and Royal 4th Army had to advance down the Vistula Imperial and Royal 7th Army in Galicia to clear the enemy and to cover the right flank of 11th Army Colonel-General von Mackensen had the task on the evening of June 20

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The dividing line between the Imperial and Royal 2nd and 11th Army was extended in such a way that Wiesenbergl belonged to the Imperial and Royal 2nd, Artasov to the 11th Army; from this place the army frontier ran north-east parallel to the Lemberg-Kamionka-Strumilowa road. On the left wing of Boehm-Ermolli's army, the Beskydy corps had to reach Kulikov; south of it the Austro-Hungarian IV Corps was to initiate the attack on Lemberg's north-western front, driving security troops to Zoltance. Of the 11th Army, Corps Franyois, whose northern sector boundary was shifted to Zolkiew (incl.)—Weryny, was to seize the heights of Dzibulki, and Corps Arz to advance its advance troops 6 km over the Zolkiew—Dobrofin road, on the left Wings at Zameczek. The bulk of the corps was not to cross the main road. June 21, after a few rain showers had already fallen in the afternoon of the 20th, brought pronounced rainy weather. This made the aerial reconnaissance and artillery observation, which were particularly important on this day, more difficult. Arz's corps broke through the Russian forces in front of them and advanced across the road in the wooded area south of Pily. His right wing then veered south, but was unable to advance the attack against the fortifications of the northern line, which had a powerful base in the mine heights near Glinsko (A 369) and the village of the same name. Here was the XXXXI. Reserve Corps in heavy fighting all day long. To support him, three battalions of infantry, three field batteries and one heavy battery of the 11th Bavarian Infantry Division from the army reserve were drawn up and deployed in front of the village of Glinsko. In the afternoon the 81st Reserve Division was able to report that it had the western summit of the mine massif in its hands and was about to advance the attack on the eastern, equally well-fortified hill. By this time it had become clear that the enemy was again moving between the Dniester and Glinsko with significant forces

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had put up for battle. He had under the impression of the defeats of 19/20. Units already in the march to the east turned back and made his last attempt to hold Lemberg. On the morning of June 21, 13, the enemy was in front of Boehm-Ermolli's army, leaning against the fortress belt of the Galician capital in the southern attachment position *) behind the Szczerek. The southern wing of this line of resistance, the Mikolajow bridgehead south of the Dniester, had already been wrested from the defenders on the 19th by the extreme right wing of Boehm-Ermolli's army, Szurmay's group and parts of the Southern Army. On the 21st these troops prepared to cross the Dniester. During the day the southern corps of General

v. Boehm-Ermolli made the change in the Szczerek sector below Lesniowice at various points, while further north under fire from the strong fortress artillery it was only possible to gain ground very slowly in the direction of the western and north-western works. Behind the attacking infantry all available troops were found here artillery united, which on the 21st fired against the belt of fortifications. The heavyweight had General v. Boehm-Ermolli, as in the breakthrough battle on the Wereszyca, placed on the north wing. Here the Beskydy Corps achieved an important success. On its southern wing, with the 35th Reserve Division, it broke through the Russian fortifications at the commanding height 280 north-east of Zaszkw and continued to advance in an easterly direction the following night. With this act, however, the value of the northern connection position had become obsolete. The north face of Lemberg was open to attack! The main body of Boehm-Ermolli's army stood ready against them, as against the south-west, west and north-west fronts; according to Mackensen's instructions, they should now take possession of the fortress as quickly as possible. The sooner Lemberg fell, the better. The Russian was not allowed to find time to collect himself. That he on ') p. 20.

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The fact that Mackensen had still not refrained from being stabbed in the back was proved by fierce fighting in the Archduke's (4th) army, which had to repel very serious Russian attacks carried out by strong forces near Podsosnina.--In the night of 21/22. the Russian went before the XXXXI. Reserve Corps back. Despite bravely defending the Bergwerkhöhe, what else could he do? To the north, the Austro-Hungarians stood ready to take him on the flank, and to the south the Beskydy corps had pushed through the breach north of Zaszkw between Lemberg and him. The troops of General V. Francois had paid attention and, driving the Russian rearguards in front of them, pushed after it in the darkness. By 6 a.m. on June 22, the 81st and 82nd Reserve Divisions and the Bavarians of the 11th Division had reached Zolkiew and thus wrested the main road leading north from Lemberg from the Russians. Early in the morning the Beskydy Corps with its 25th Reserve Division made a dashing attack on Hill 344 southwest of Wiesenberg and by 9 o'clock in the morning laid hands on Kulikow with the 35th Reserve Division. It was from the Generaloberst v. Mackensen was once again instructed to block the road leading north-east from Lemberg via Zoltance by advanced detachments. In the meantime things were developing at a breakneck speed around Lemberg, probably not uninfluenced by what was happening in the Southern Army, which had crossed the Dniester at Zurawno since the 21st and was deployed in the area east of Lemberg. At 4 a.m. on June 22, artillery fire broke out on the west and north-west works of the fortress, especially on the Rzesna ridge and the annexes up to the mighty Lysa Gora. Already at 5 o'clock in the morning the Rzesna-Polska plant on the Rzesna Ridge of the Vienna Landwehr of the Imperial and Royal XIX. Corps fell victim, and now Boehm-Ermolli's army stormed one fortification after the other. On the south-

west front the Imperial and Royal 29th Infantry Division seized the Sknilow fortifications. The K. & K. IV Corps struggled particularly bitterly for the fortifications on the north-western front

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and the Lysa Gora. [At 9 o'clock in the morning the works at height 348 and the southern annex entrenchments are captured by the 43rd Infantry Division of the Imperial and Royal Corps. At 11 a.m. the Imperial and Royal Infantry Regiment "Wilhelm I German Emperor and King of Prussia" of the 27th Infantry Division took the strong Lysa Gora with a charging hand. The Russian counterattacks failed. At noon the troops of Emperor and King Franz Joseph were already penetrating the liberated city! There they were greeted stormily by the population. After around ten months of rule under Russian thumbs, they prepared the General der Kavallerie von Boehm-Ermolli received a jubilant, festive reception at 4 p.m. on his entry into the regained Galician capital; the next day she was able to greet the Commander-in-Chief, Generaloberst von Mackensen, who arrived to congratulate Boehm-Ermolli. The rapid fall of Lemberg was not least the consequence of the indefatigable advance eastward by the allied troops north of Lemberg commanded the great road at Zoltance and southwest with his field guns. Franyois' corps had taken Fabarius' Dzibulki division and Stocken's division had reached Blyszczyny. Advance troops faced enemy rear guards at the edge of the forest south-east of Zoltaniecka-Wola and near Zeldec. Corps Arz had reached 6 km east and north-east of Zolkiew; ahead of him the K. and 11th Honved Cavalry Divisions were in touch with the enemy east of Turynka. On the report of the Generaloberst v. Mackensen of the capture of Lemberg to the supreme warlord, the Kaiser issued the following cabinet order to him: "In unstoppable advance and in loyal brotherhood in arms, the German and Austro-Hungarian armed forces subordinate to you have a tough, stubbornly fighting opponent from section to section from his fortifications

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thrown back. With masterful, purposeful leadership you have led your tried and tested troops from victory to victory, fighting with incomparable bravery and bravely overcoming all exertions and privations. After the forced fall of Przemysl, which had been occupied by the enemy for months, the capital of Galicia has now been snatched from the enemy again with unprecedented speed. I want to express my imperial gratitude and my highest appreciation for you and all the troops under your command by promoting you to Field Marshal General. Our God, the ruler of battles, escort you further out of your triumphal procession. Grand Headquarters, June 22, 1915. Signed Wilhelm R." The Field Marshal announced this order to the 11th Army in the following words: "His Majesty's words preclude any additions on my part. But I congratulate all officers and men to whom they are given such praise. Next to the grace of God and my king, I thank the bravery of the troops entrusted to

me, as well as the insight and energy of the leaders of all ranks; it will remind me for the rest of my life of the warlike manhood alive in the 11th Army. The Commander-in-Chief: signed by Mackensen, Field Marshal and Adjutant General." In recognition of his services, the Chief of the General Staff of the 11th Army, Colonel von Seeckt, was promoted to Major General.

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The consequences of the breakthrough battle. (Sketches 1, 2 and 7.) On the evening of June 22, the Imperial and Royal Army Corps camped between the Dawidowka and the Dumny sections east of Lemberg with the foremost parts in the general line of heights north of Dawidow-Zapytow. Already the consequences of the great victory seemed to be showing! According to reliable reports, the Russians now retreated from the San-Vistula angle and on the left bank of the Vistula. Air reports, prisoner statements and other information left Mackensen's high command in no doubt that the desired division of the Russian forces was taking place. The enemy masses defeated in the area of the Lemberg Fortress and to the south of it seemed to be retreating rapidly in a strictly easterly direction. The shock of the Guard and the right wing of the XXII. The parts of the Russian "south-western front" that had been pushed aside by the reserve corps against Rawa Ruska gathered in the north in the Tomaszow area and were placed under the supreme command of the "western front". Apparently there were only three Russian corps in the gap between the two groups, out of a line of about 40 km, retreating towards the Bug partly in a north-easterly and partly in an east-northeast direction. This success must be further expanded! For this, the new instructions are decisive, which were agreed between the two army commanders and the Colonel-General v. Mackensen during the 22nd. The 11th and 4th Imperial and Royal Army had to head north, with the German Beskydy Corps assigned to Generaloberst v. Mackensen was assumed. It had to cover the flank of 11th Army. De». The K. & K. 2nd Army was to be responsible for the further pursuit of the enemy in an easterly direction, while the Southern Army was also to cross the Dniester below Zurawno and advance via the lower Gnila Lipa (Diagram 1). June 23 showed, however, that the blowing up of the Russian

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Front had not yet succeeded. The Imperial and Royal 2nd Army had to attack strong enemy positions again, and the troops of General der Kavallerie v. the Marwitz were fighting. Mackensen's High Command therefore became convinced that if the 11th Army advanced rapidly northwards, the Beskydy Corps, even after the K. and 11th Honved Cavalry Divisions had been put under its command, would not suffice to cover advancing armies. At the request of Field Marshal v. Mackensen, therefore first determined the Austro-Hungarian army command in Teschen that the left wing of Boehm-Ermolli's army was not to advance towards Busk (on the Bug) but had to

expand to Kamionka-Strumilowa. The main road leading from Lemberg to this place formed the border between the 2nd and 11th armies of the Imperial and Royal Army. June 24 saw Boehm-Ermolli's army again facing strong Russian positions. The Russians even launched counterattacks with large numbers against the right wing of 11th Army, the Beskydy Corps, so that it was initially impossible for parts of the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army to relieve them. It emerged from these events that operations could not be carried out to the east and north without having a solid line of communication between the two assault groups. This situation was supported by a letter from Field Marshal v. Mackensen to the German and Austro-Hungarian army command. It had roughly the following content (Sketch 1): The forces of the 11th Army and the 4th Imperial and Royal Army were sufficient to lead a strong thrust in a northerly direction on the right bank of the Vistula, especially if they were defeated by the troops on the left wing the Archduke's (4th) Army, the formerly independent Imperial and Royal 1st Army, would be reinforced on the eastern bank of the Vistula. But the thrust can only be sufficiently effective if 11th Army is not forced to divert considerable forces to cover its right flank. If the enemy opposes our attack head-on in a line further to the rear between the Vistula and the Bug, he can cross at any time with the help of the railways

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Bring in Brest Litovsk and Kovel troops against our right flank. The Beskydy Corps alone is not enough to secure them, since the right wing of 11th Army must be sent to Hrubieszow-Cholm, because otherwise the armies would have too much breadth. It is therefore desirable that the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army should join the Bormar march of the 11th Army in squadrons from the left wing with at least three army corps in the general direction towards Vladimir Wolynsk. If the expected enemy action from the east does not occur, this direction of advance by the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army will result in the continuation of a bypass of a position west of the Bug leaning against this sector and continued cover against Brest Litovsk. In the opinion of the Field Marshal, the Imperial and Royal 7th Army in conjunction with the Southern Army and Szurmayer's Group on the right wing of the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army were sufficient to clear Galicia from the Russians. On the evening of June 25, the shifts in 11th Army that had become necessary were complete; the 22nd Infantry Division had been transferred to the army and assigned to Corps Emmich. On the 26th the attack began, in which the right wing of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army also took part. He advanced well; much ground was gained with the bulk of Eleventh Army. But the Beskydy corps was stuck as flank cover against considerable enemy forces. Communication with this corps must not be severed, and so the forward movement of the troops on the left had to be restricted more and more. Since more and more formations had to be turned to the east to protect the flanks, Mackensen's thrust was bound to die out in the foreseeable future. But then the purpose of the whole operation was lost. Its aim was to gain the flank of the enemy who was still stubbornly attacking in front of the Imperial and

Royal 4th Army and at times attacked in considerable strength, to encircle him as far as possible and in the further course to cut through the rear connections of the Russian 4th Army, which was advancing Ivangorod, west of the Vistula, the army detachment of Colonel-General v. Wohrsch faced.

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Everything depended on speed. Field Marshal V. Mackensen had therefore reported to the German High Command on the 27th that his advance in a northerly and north-westerly direction would probably come to a halt on the 29th, since enemy action from Sokal was to be expected. The Field Marshal suggested that the procedure be carried out at least until the Russian front on the Tanev gave way, thereby enabling the Imperial and Royal 4th Army to advance. For this, however, it was necessary to have parts of the Boehm-Ermolli army take over the security on the bow up to the area south of Krhschnopol. Then the Beskydy corps could follow and remain behind the right wing as a reserve force. (Sketch 7.) It was then agreed by the two army commanders that the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army had to take over the desired security up to the Rata estuary south of Krystynopol by releasing strong reserves behind its north wing at Kamionka-Strumilowa. The three infantry divisions of the Imperial and Royal 4th Army north of the Vistula were to be brought up via Lemberg to attack the right flank of 11th Army. Until then, the German divisions intended for evacuation to the west were assigned to Field Marshal v. Mackensen made available again. On the basis of these agreements on June 28 to Field Marshal v. Mackensen's instructions stipulated that the 11th and Imperial and Royal Imperial and Royal Armies had to attack further north between Bug and Vistula. The 2nd Imperial and Royal Army was to follow the enemy retreating north-east to the Zlota Lipa and to the Busk-Kamionka-Strumilowa line. A new army was to be formed on its left wing from contributions from the Imperial and Royal 4th Army with the task of advancing near and south of Sokal, in order to intervene on the right or left as necessary. Adjoining the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army on the right, the Southern Army was to first advance via the Gnila Lipa to the Zlota Lipa, while the Imperial and Royal 7th Army carried out its previous task of securing the

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right flank of the other armies and the holdings of Chernivtsi — retained. On the left bank of the Vistula, after the last divisions of the former Imperial and Royal 1st Army had withdrawn, Army Detachment Woyrsch took over the area from the Vistula to the Pilica; it was to exploit every retreat of opposing enemy forces from this front for an attack and to follow the enemy who might be retreating to the Vistula. On the 28th the left wing of the 2nd Imperial and Royal Army reached Kamionka-Strumilova, the right wing of the 11th Krystynopol; staggered backwards on the right, the Beskydy Corps secured at Mosty Wielkie. The advance that had been initiated soon produced the expected consequences. Eleventh Army threw

back the debris of the defeated corps in Galicia in a northerly and north-westerly direction. At the same time, the archduke's army attacked with all their might. Soon the enemy gave way along the whole front. Thus the 11th and 4th Imperial and Royal Army fought rearguards on July 2nd in a line running from south of Hrubieszow—south of Grabowiec—south past Krasnik to the Vistula near Iosefow. The Beskydy corps following in echelon covered the right flank on the bow. On the other side of the Vistula, however, the army detachment of Generaloberst v. Woyrsch in connection with parts of the former Imperial and Royal 1st Army that had not yet been dispatched in the direction of the river and forced a retreat here as well, all the more so as the thrust of the 11th Army was already dangerously damaging the rear of the Russian ones 4th Army threatened. At this time, the Imperial and Royal 7th Army repelled multiple attacks in their positions on the Dniester. The Southern Army reached the Złota Lipa on July 4, 1915, and the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army on the 5th. Thus a great, decisive success was achieved by the battle of Grodek-Lemberg. Numerous Russian corps had been reduced to rubble and had to seek salvation in retreat. While in the breakthrough battle at Lubaczow the enemy was able to pull up reinforcements from the other fronts and throw them into the fire, during the battle he was *) The already published individual publication No. 26, "Die Kampf der Bug-Armee" [The Battles of the Bug Army], follows on from this situation .

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was no longer in a position to do so near Lemberg. With what he had he had to fight and then go back with the corps beaten and shattered. It was only later in Poland that he found the opportunity to strengthen himself again by hastily brought in reserves. The Battle of Grodek-Lviv is a link in a chain of mighty feats accomplished by the allied troops in the east from the spring to late summer of 1915, which brought the Russian masses into the line of north-west corner Romania - west of Tarnopol-Dubno-Luzk —Pinsk—east of Lake Baranovichi-Narocz—west of Riga. final considerations. With an unconditional will to win, our troops made the breakthrough north of Lemberg in a magnificent assault. The troops went forward with admirable courage, inspired by the spirit of unconditional fulfillment of duty, which in general gave us so great things in this war. Their leaders had shown that they did not lack in initiative and responsibility. Unexpected situations often arose; the leaders of all ranks knew how to find their way in at once. It is important to help the neighbor who is still in the middle of a heavy battle; immediately grabbed and yet not lost sight of the future, in general - the urge to move forward is above everything; he celebrates triumphs. The battle of Grodek-Lemberg is a success of boldness, of which our great war philosopher Clausewitz, whose spirit had already influenced our officer corps so successfully in 1870/71, says that "boldness is the noblest virtue from the porter and drummer up to the general , is the right steel, which gives the weapon its sharpness and its shine". The 11th Army has in these days lived up to another word of General von Clausewitz: "The more the commander

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used to demanding from his soldiers, the more certain he is that the demand will be met. The soldier is just as proud of the difficulties he has overcome as of the dangers he has overcome." How aptly General Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven describes the basis of our successes in the "Deutsche Revue" when he recalls Napoleon's words that morale decides in war, writes: "Our troops have achieved their greatest successes in mobile warfare. So at the beginning of the war in Belgium and northern France, at Tannenberg and in the Masurian Winter Battle, in Galicia and Poland in the summer of 1915, in the autumn of the same year in Serbia and in 1916 in Transylvania and Romania. Certainly, the skill of the superior leadership, specially trained in this mode of warfare, did a great deal here; the artillery prepared the attacking infantry bravely. But these unparalleled victories were only possible because the German soldier was internally far superior to his opponents. If ever, the Napoleonic saying has found its confirmation here." Yes, the moral superiority led us to the victories in Galicia. The enemy's infantry already showed no more attack power in mid-May. Sometimes here, sometimes there, a part of it becomes useless. The attack was soon exhausted, although it was always undertaken on the spot in question with large and far superior numbers. The Russians were certainly not lacking in bravery. On the contrary, the troops fought with admirable obstinacy, but they fought not with the will to win, not with the striving for success. The troops lacked leaders who, with their example and with their confidence in the efficiency of their troops, knew how to carry them away. There was no Suvorov, as in the early days of the Napoleonic wars, no Skobelev, like Plevna in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, men whom the Russian soldier looked up to with unconditional trust and allowed to look up. Already in the Grodek-Magierow position there is hopelessness

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Confusion in the formations, and apparently there is no one with the strength to intervene to put an end to the jumble of the haphazard units. The artillery is suffering from a severe lack of ammunition. The troops see themselves robbed of a large part of their leaders. The supply of hand weapons falters. Those who come forward as backup crews without rifles are told to get their weapons from the dead and wounded. There is even an order that states that recovering weapons is more important than caring for the wounded! The Russian steamroller has become a clay colossus as a result of the persistent heavy defeats that begin with Tannenberg. German troops, accustomed to victory and filled with the will to win, pounded on him incessantly alongside their loyal and brave allies, the Austro-Hungarians. New blows fall without rest and rest. Is it astonishing then when one takes letters from prisoners which say: "The cursed German has been chasing us through Galicia since April 20*)!... His artillery is admirable... Our situation is terrible, we can hardly keep

us alive. We are in the front line, and if you don't go ahead, your own troops will shoot you from behind, that's what's ordered." * In his great work On War, General von Clausewitz: "Only when the character of the people and the customs of war carry each other in constant interaction can a people hope to have a firm footing in the political world." But we want and must preserve this, if not all the precious blood that is ours glorious fighters on the battlefields of Europe should have flowed in vain If it is not to be that all the privation and toil *) Russian date.

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in vain was the abundance of devotional willingness to make sacrifices and the most serious fulfillment of duty. But on the battlefields of this tremendous struggle, which we call the World War, shines a precious jewel, which probably belongs to every German soldier: the jewel of a sense of duty and martial virtue. We should and must bequeath this jewel to our descendants, so that they can guard it and take it as their own valuable possession. But we have to watch that it doesn't lose its radiant splendor! Let us never forget that those outside did not sacrifice their blood for themselves, do not bear the dreadfulness of modern battle for themselves! They do their duty, endure their suffering for the emperor, people and empire, for the future, for children and grandchildren. Harvest carefully the fruit that loyalty and steadfastness, the will to win and a sense of duty of the German regiments produced on the battlefields; then our great Moltke's word will also retain its value: "Always faithfully ready for the glory of the empire!"